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ABSTRACT

In proscribing contributory infringement of patents, § 271(c) of Title 35 of the United
States Code unambiguously provides statutory protection for certain unpatented
components of patented combinations and certain unpatented materials or
apparatuses used in patented processes. The doctrine of implied license provides a
viable defense against claims of contributory infringement. Such a finding may result
from a variety of related doctrines, such as the exhaustion doctrine or the doctrine of
equitable estoppel. However, unlike the Supreme Court's application of the former
doctrine in Dawson Chemical Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., involving an unpatented
chemical used in a patented process, the Federal Circuit's application of the latter
doctrine in Anton/Bauer, Inc. v. PAG, Ltd., involving an unpatented component of a
patented combination, served to permanently abrogate a patentee's right to the
limited monopoly provided by § 271(c)-the § 271(c) monopoly right. This comment
examines these differing standards and argues that unless modified to properly
account for the § 271(c) monopoly right, the Anton/Bauer implied license standard
will substantially weaken the protection against contributory infringement afforded
by § 271(c).
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For if anything is settled in the patent law, it is that the combination patent
covers only the totality of the elements in the claim and that no element,
separately viewed, is within the grant.1

INTRODUCTION

In ancient Israel, long before our concept of a patent came into existence, 2 two
* J.D. Candidate I.P., June 2005, The John Marshall Law School. B.S. Mechanical Engineering,
University of Dayton, December 2001. To my Grandfather, John H. Lechleiter: Thanks, Pop, for
imparting your love of gadgetry; it led me here. I would also like to thank William "Bubba" Phelps
for teaching me, albeit unknowingly, an invaluable lesson about the rewards of persistence. See
Douglas Lavin, Youwannadeal? Bucking Detroit Trend, Landmark Chevrolet Still Uses the Hard
Sell, WALL ST. J., July 8, 1994, at Al. Finally, thank you to the staff of The John Marshall Review of
Intellectual Property Law and especially David A. Dorth, Grace C.Y. Leung and Brian R. Cheslek
for their invaluable editorial assistance. Any mistakes in this article are my own.
I Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336, 344, (1961) [hereinafter Aro A
(emphasis added). In a strict sense, this assertion holds the same truth today that it did in 1961.
However, in Dawson Chemical Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., a case involving contributory infringement
of a patented process, the Supreme Court implicitly qualified its statement in Aro Iby clarifying the
statutory protection mandated by § 271(c) for certain elements of patented combinations. 448 U.S.
176, 201 (1980); 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (2000). Thus, while the assertion that "no element, separately
viewed, is within the [patent] grant" technically still holds true, the instant that a combination
patent issues, § 271(c) protection becomes available for certain of its components. Dawson, 448 U.S.
at 201. See infra text accompanying note 20 (discussing the distinction between what is recognized
as the traditional right accorded with a patent grant, expressed by the Court in Aro , and the right
accorded by § 271(c)).
Ao _is so known because it was the first of two Ao cases heard by the Supreme Court. See Aro
Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476 (1964) [hereinafter Aro IA. Both Aro
cases involved the same parties and stemmed from the same controversy. Dawson, 448 U.S. at 217
(stating that the Aro decisions "emerged from a single case involving an action for contributory
infringement").
2 See WILLARD PHILLIPS, THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR INVENTIONS 23-24 (Boston, Am. Stationers'
Co. 1837). Modern Anglo-American patent law is derived from the historic tradition of the
European-and especially the English-system of monopolies, which, for certain monarchically
favored manufacturers and merchants, granted exclusive privileges "cover[ing] almost all the
mechanical arts, and many branches of foreign trade." Id. In 1623, the English Statue of Monopolies
abolished all then existing monopolies, but did so with certain exceptions. 21 Jam. 1, c. 3, reprinted
in 9 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS app. 8 (2002); PHILLIPS, supra, at 24-25. Exceptions
were made for "(a) ... any letters patents (b) and grants of privilege for the term of fourteen years or
under, hereafter to be made, of the sole working or making of any manner of new manufactures
within [the English] realm (c) to the true and first inventor (d) and inventors of such manufactures."
21 Jam. 1, c. 3, § 6.
The specific establishment of American patent law can be traced to the United States
Constitution, Article I, Section 8, Clause 8, which was adopted in 1787 and ratified into effect by
"the necessary ninth state" in 1788, DAAN BRAVEMAN ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: STRUCTURE
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women came before the wise King Solomon, imploring him to settle their dispute. 3
The women were prostitutes who had been living in the same house. 4 Both women

AND RIGHTS IN OUR FEDERAL SYSTEM § 1.02[c], at 6 (4th ed. 2000). The Constitution provides that

"Congress shall have Power ... To promote the Progress of Science and Useful Arts, by securing for
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries." U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cls. 1, 8. Under its Constitutional mandate, American patent
law continues to be rooted in basic tenets similar to those underlying the English system after the
passage of the Statute of Monopolies. PHILLIPS, supra, at 23-25. See also 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000)
(limiting patentable subject matter to "new and useful process[es], machine[s], manufacture[s], or
composition[s] of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof'); 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2002)
(limiting who may receive a patent to the first true inventor or inventors); 35 U.S.C. § 154(a) (2000)
(defining a patent grant as the right to exclude others from the patented subject matter and setting
patent term as twenty years from the date of issue).
Today, in addition to its Constitutional basis, American patent law is controlled by two primary
sources: "the federal patent law found in U.S. statutes and regulations, and . . . federal judicial
decisions interpreting and applying these statutory and regulatory provisions." JANICE M.
MUELLER, AN INTRODUCTION TO PATENT LAW 27 (2003). The federal patent statutes are located in
Title 35 of the United States Code (35 U.S.C.), and the federal patent regulations are located in Title
37 of the Code of Federal Regulations (37 C.F.R.).
3
1 Kings 3:16-28.
16 Then came there two women, that wore harlots, unto the king, and stood
before him.
17 And the one woman said, 0 my lord, I and this woman dwell in one house;
and I was delivered of a child with her in the house.
18 And it came to pass the third day after that I was delivered, that this
woman was delivered also: and we were together; there was no stranger with us
in the house, save we two in the house.
19 And this woman's child died in the night; because she overlaid it.
20 And she arose at midnight, and took my son from beside me, while thine
handmaid slept, and laid it in her bosom, and laid her dead child in my bosom.
21 And when I rose in the morning to give my child suck, behold, it was dead;
but when I had considered it in the morning, behold, it was not my son, which I
did bear.
22 And the other woman said, Nay; but the living is my son, and the dead is
thy son. And this said, No; but the dead is thy son, and the living is my son. Thus
they spake before the king.
23 Then said the king, The one saith, This is my son that liveth, and thy son
is the dead: and the other saith, Nay; but thy son is the dead, and my son is the
living.
24 And the king said, Bring me a sword. And they brought a sword before the
king.
25 And the king said, Divide the living child in two, and give half to the one,
and half to the other.
26 Then spake the woman whose the living child was unto the king, for her
bowels yearned upon her son, and she said, 0 my lord, give her the living child,
and in no wise slay it. But the other said, Let it be neither mine nor thine, but
divide it.
27 Then the king answered and said, Give her the living child, and in no wise
slay it: she is the mother thereof.
28 And all Israel heard of the judgment which the king had judged; and they
feared the king: for they saw that the wisdom of God was in him to do judgment.
Id.
4 Id. at 3:16-17, 20-21.
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had also given birth to a male child, the second within three days of the first. 5 When
one of the babies died during the night, its mother placed it with the other woman,
who was asleep, and took the remaining child as her own.6 After the women had
recounted their stories and stated their grievances, King Solomon decided that the
dispute could be settled simply and quickly: he commanded that a sword be used to
divide the living child in two, one half for each of the women.7 In a grim but not
altogether unfitting irony, the woman who was later exposed as the false mother
8
found this resolution to be satisfactory.
Perhaps, because the true mother of the living child was not readily
identifiable, 9 simply dividing the child would have been the purest (yet clearly the
cruelest) form of equity that King Solomon could have provided to the parties. But,
although fair in a blindly just and morbidly strict sense, it is obvious that dividing
the baby would have brought a needlessly brutal resolution to the dispute; one which,
at least for the true mother, would have been far less than satisfactory. After all,
because one of the women was indeed the true mother, such a resolution would have
effected not only an end to the dispute but it clearly would have deprived the rightful
mother of her child. Accordingly, King Solomon was revered for his great wisdom 10
and this parable likely survives because he knew that the child's true mother would
rather give the child to another than see it put to death for the sake of resolving the
dispute.1 1

I. A

MODERN PARABLE: CONTRIBUTORY INFRINGEMENT LITIGATION

The parable of King Solomon and the baby has a modern, though less
wrenching, analogue in the realm of patent infringement litigation: 12 those cases in
which an alleged contributory infringer is denied the right to sell a material and
nonstaple "component of a patented machine, manufacture, combination or

Id.
Id.
7 Id.
s Id.

at 3:18.

at 3:19-20.
at 3:24-25.
at 3:26.

9 See Roosevelt Wright, Jr., Expositions of Bible Scripture, at http://sermonideas.com/
bilkings.htm (last visited Jan. 30, 2004) (discussing 1 Kings 3:25-27 and the background to the
parable of King Solomon and the baby related in 1 Kngs 3:16-28). In their initial attempts to
determine the child's true mother, the lower courts had little evidence with which to make a
decision, apart from one woman's word against that of the other. Id. When the lower courts were
unable to decide the case, it was sent directly to King Solomon. Id.
10 1 Kings 3:28.
11See id. at 3:24-27.
12 The offense of direct infringement is codified in 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2000). Section 271(a)
provides that "[w]hoever without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented
invention, within the United States or imports into the United States any patented invention during
the term of the patent therefor, infringes the patent." Td. A direct infringer is a party whose own
actions violate § 271(a), as opposed to a party whose actions lead others to violate § 271(a) through
either or both inducement of infringement (§ 271(b)) or contributory infringement (§ 271(c)). See
Anton/Bauer, Inc. v. PAG, Ltd., 329 F.3d 1343, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2003). Thus, patent infringement
litigation can be characterized essentially as a lawsuit brought to check certain unauthorized
activities as to a patented invention.
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composition, or a material or apparatus for use in practicing a patented process." 13
The legal authority that facilitates such a denial is statutory: 35 U.S.C. § 271(c)
prescribes the conditions necessary for contributory infringement liability.14

A. A Modern cVaby". The SingularMonopoly Right Conferredby § 271()
Section 271(c) does not operate alone and thus cannot be read in isolation;
rather, under the United States Supreme Court's analysis in Dawson Chemical Co. v.
Rohm & Haas Co.,15 § 271(c) must be viewed in light of the counterbalancing
provisions of § 271(d).16 Section 271(d) enumerates five specific actions that patentees
may take without fear of either losing their right to recover for contributory
infringement or being subject to a charge of "patent misuse," a judicially-developed
17
defense to contributory infringement.

1' 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (2000). The term "nonstaple" is meant to connote the type of item that §
271(c) defines as neither "a staple article or commodity of commerce" nor "suitable for substantial
noninfringing use." See Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 186 n.6 (1980)
(defining "staple" to mean any component that does not fit the definition of [non]staple" in § 271(c)).
1' Contributory infringement is the phrase encompassing "[t]he idea that a patentee should be
able to obtain relief against those whose acts facilitate infringement by others." Dawson, 448 U.S. at
179-80. Contributory infringement has also been defined as the act of "intentionally] aiding ...
another in the unlawful making or selling of a patented invention" and is "usually done by making
or selling one part of [a] patented invention . . . with the intent and purpose of so aiding." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 780-81 (6th ed. 1990). The concept of contributory infringement "has been part of
[American jurisprudence] since Wallace v. Holmes, 29 F. Cas. 74 (C.C. Conn. 1871) (No. 17100)," and
was codified in 1952 as 35 U.S.C. § 271(c). Dawson, 448 U.S. at 180. Section 271(c) provides:
Whoever offers to sell or sells within the United States or imports into the
United States a component of a patented machine, manufacture, combination or
composition, or a material or apparatus for use in practicing a patented process,
constituting a material part of the invention, knowing the same to be especially
made or especially adapted for use in an infringement of such patent, and not a
staple article or commodity of commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing
use, shall be liable as a contributory infringer.
35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (2000).
When a court finds in favor of a party who has brought an infringement action, the court must
award that party "damages adequate to compensate for the infringement, but in no event less than a
reasonable royalty for the use made of the invention by the infringer, together with interest and
costs as fixed by the court." 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2000). Also, in "exceptional cases," 35 U.S.C. § 285
(2000) empowers courts with the discretion to "award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing
party."
15448 U.S. 176 (1980).
16-Id. at 201. "Section 271(c) identifies the basic dividing line between contributory infringement
and patent misuse ....
[But, the] limitations on contributory infringement written into § 271(c) are
counterbalanced by limitations on patent misuse in § 271(d)." Id.
17 Id. at 179 (stating that "whether [a patentee] . . . may maintain an action for patent
infringement" depends on a finding that the patentee is not "guilty of patent misuse"). "The idea
that a patentee should be denied relief against infringers [for patent misuse] . . . goes back at least
as far as Motion PicturePatents Co. v. UniversalFilm Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917)." Dawson, 448
U.S. at 180. See also Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 493 (1942) (using "misuse"
terminology).
The concept of patent misuse was codified in 1952 as § 271(d). Section 271(d) provides:
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Section 271(d) provides in pertinent part that a patentee is entitled to perform
acts, or license others to perform acts, "which, if performed without [the patentee's]
consent would constitute contributory infringement of the patent."18 The provisions of
§ 271(d), when viewed in conjunction with § 271(c), "effectively confer upon the
patentee, as a lawful adunet of his patent rights, a limited power to exclude others
from competition in nonstaple goods." 19 As this language implies, where a nonstaple
item, while itself unpatented, is nonetheless essential to practicing a patent, § 271(c)
supplies an additional right outside of the scope of the patentee's traditional right to
exclude. 20 Under the protection conferred by § 271(d), then, this additional right
No patent owner otherwise entitled to relief for infringement or contributory
infringement of a patent shall be denied relief or deemed guilty of misuse or
illegal extension of the patent right by reason of his having done one or more of
the following: (1) derived revenue from acts which if performed by another
without his consent would constitute contributory infringement of the patent; (2)
licensed or authorized another to perform acts which if performed without his
consent would constitute contributory infringement of the patent; (3) sought to
enforce his patent rights against infringement or contributory infringement; (4)
refused to license or use any rights to the patent; or (5) conditioned the license of
any rights to the patent or the sale of the patented product on the acquisition of a
license to rights in another patent or purchase of a separate product, unless, in
view of the circumstances, the patent owner has market power in the relevant
market for the patent or patented product on which the license or sale is
conditioned.

35 U.S.C. § 271(d) (2000).
18 Jd

19Dawson, 448 U.S. at 201 (emphasis added).
20 See id. The patentee's rights in this scenario may be viewed as twofold. First is the classic

and primary right conferred to every inventor the very instant he receives a patent grant: the
monopoly right that allows him to exclude others from practicing the teachings of his patent. 35
U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2000). See also Dawson, 448 U.S. at 215 (stating that "[t]he essence of a patent
grant is the right to exclude others from profiting by the patented invention"); Ortho Pharm. Corp.
v. Genetics Inst., Inc., 52 F.3d 1026, 1031-32 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (stating that "[t]he proprietary rights
granted by any patent are the rights to exclude others from making, using or selling the invention in
the United States"). In practice, the existence of this primary patent right under § 154(a) is
protected by § 271(a), which proscribes direct infringement. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2000).
Second is the additional, but less extensive, monopoly right conferred by § 271(c), which has
been described as a "lawful adjunct" to the rights conferred by a patent grant. Dawson, 448 U.S. at
201. This secondary right is available to protect certain unpatented components of any patented
combination. 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (2000). Section 271(d) serves to guarantee that the right accorded by
§ 271(c) may be exercised freely by patentees. Dawson, 448 U.S. at 201. The Supreme Court has
interpreted this secondary patent right as conferring to the patentee a limited monopoly as to any
"material part" of a patented combination that is "not a staple article or commodity of commerce
suitable for substantial noninfringing use." 35 U.S.C. § 271(c); Dawson, 448 U.S. at 201. If it is
determined that an element of a patented combination is not protected by the provisions of § 271(c),
no § 271(c) monopoly right can exist as to that article. See Dawson, 448 U.S. at 201.
The important distinction between the two rights is that the secondary monopoly right
conferred by § 271(c) applies only to certain components of patented inventions, not patented
inventions themselves. 35 U.S.C. § 271(c). The second right is not automatically conferred as a true
part of the first, but as a conditional corollary of the first. Dawson, 448 U.S. at 201. Accordingly,
there may be instances where a patentee is found to have no right to avail himself of the monopoly
right conferred by § 271(c). Such a finding perhaps could result if the disputed item was found to be
a "staple article . . . of commerce." 35 U.S.C. § 271(c). In such a case, the patentee could neither
claim the protection afforded by § 271(d) nor state a valid claim of contributory infringement under §

[3:355 2004]

John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law

essentially provides patentees with both a monopoly over the manufacture and sale
of the unpatenteditem and a concomitant power to exclude others from engaging in
those activities. 21 Throughout this comment, this singular right will be referred to as
the § 271(c) monopoly right.
By the very definition of "monopoly," the § 271(c) monopoly right is either
absolute in the patentee or, if severed or denied by way of judicial action,
nonexistent. 22 Thus, similar to the disputed baby of the parable, once it has been
divided amongst opposing litigants, the § 271(c) monopoly right effectively dies as to
the patentee, its true "mother."23 If the § 271(c) monopoly right can be likened to the
baby, then a contributory infringement suit under § 271(c) is analogous to the
mother's struggle for control of her baby. Accordingly, the litigants can be likened to
the embattled women, and the role of the wise King Solomon assigned to the court
having jurisdiction to adjudicate the infringement dispute.

B. A Modern 'Sword".' The Doctrine of ImpliedLicense
But what of the king's sword, that brutal and task-blind implement that might
have been used to divide the baby? 24 In Anton/Bauer, Inc. v. PAG, Ltd., the United
States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit ("CAFC")25 wielded the modern
271(c). Dawson, 448 U.S. at 201. In any event, even where the patentee has no § 271(c) monopoly
right as to some component of his invention, he retains the right to exclude provided by § 154(a) as
to his invention as a whole. 35 U.S.C. §§ 154(a)(1), 271(a), (c). As such, he can enforce his
exclusionary right by bringing suit under § 271(a) for the purpose of enjoining direct infringement.
35 U.S.C. § 271(a).
21 See Dawson, 448 U.S. at 201. Although § 271(c) only proscribes the sale of certain unpatented
items, 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (2000), as a practical matter, this prohibition likely would also extend to
the manufacturing of such items in cases where the items were manufactured exclusively to be sold
and not for some other purpose, such as research and development.
22 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 14, at 1007. In this context, a monopoly is '[a] privilege
or peculiar advantage vested in [a] person[] or compan[y], consisting in the exclusive right (or power)
to carry on a particular business or trade, manufacture a particular article, or control the sale of the
whole supply of a particular [item]." Id. (emphasis added). Thus, by definition, when the element of
exclusivity is lost, the monopoly is lost. See id.
23 An important distinction must be drawn here. In cases of patented combinations, the "baby"
cannot be analogized to the totality of a patentee's rights under a given patent. This is because if the
patentee's primary right-the right to exclude-is severed and lost as to a single infringer, the
patentee still retains that right as to all others. However, if a patentee is entitled to a § 271(c)
monopoly right-a second, separate and distinct right-and it is subsequently severed, the monopoly
is completely abrogated: the element of exclusivity would be lost as all parties who might choose to
benefit from the patentee's lost right could then do so freely.
24 1 Kings 3:24-25.
25 See 28 U.S.C. § 41 (2000). The CAFC is the newest of the thirteen United States Courts of
Appeals. Id. See also Act of April 2, 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (codified in scattered
sections of 28 U.S.C.) (establishing the CAFC). The CAFC was created "to promote greater
uniformity in certain areas of federal jurisdiction." See Federal Judicial Center, Federal CircuitAet
1982, at http://air.fjc.gov/history/landmark/22a frm.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2004). These "certain
areas of federal jurisdiction" include disputes arising under the patent laws, as well as disputes
arising under a few other specialized bodies of law. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1295, 1338. The CAFC also has
jurisdiction to hear appeals of decisions made by the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences
(BPAI). 35 U.S.C. § 141 (2002).
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equivalent of the sword, the doctrine of implied license, and used it to sever a § 271(c)
26
monopoly right as to the components of a patented combination.
Part II will define the doctrine of implied license and discuss cases involving
three doctrines that have each given rise to a "related but distinct" 27 form of implied
license: (1) the exhaustion doctrine, 28 which confers an exhaustion-implied license; (2)
the doctrine of equitable estoppel, 29 which confers an equity-implied license; and (3)
31
the doctrine of permissible repair,30 which confers a repair-implied license.
Building on that foundation, Part III will examine Dawson Chemical Co. v.
Robin & Haas Co., 32 in which the Supreme Court articulated the § 271(c) monopoly
right as to an unpatented element of a patented process, and Anton/Bauer, which
dealt with an unpatented component of a patented combination.33 The comparison of
the reasoning and results in these two cases will focus on points of departure and
highlight a possible misapplication of the equity-implied license analysis as the
reason for the severance of the patentee's § 271(c) monopoly right and an incorrect
decision in Anton/Ba uer.
Part IV will begin by articulating a solution to the negative implications of the
Anton/Bauer decision: it will be argued that an intermediate third step should be
added to the CAFC's equity-implied license analysis so as to insure that a patentee's
§ 271(c) monopoly right is properly considered. The proposal section will conclude by
addressing the doctrine of permissible repair as it might have factored into
Anton/Baue_ it will be argued that if the CAFC had used the proposed implied

26 329 F.3d 1343, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2003), reh'gandreh'genbane denied.
27 LG Elecs., Inc. v. Asustek Computer, Inc., 65 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1589, 1596 (N.D. Cal. 2002).
28 See Adams v. Burke, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 453, 457 (1873) (recognizing the principle that "when
[patented articles] are once lawfully made and sold, there ... [cannot be a] restriction on their use..
• implied for the benefit of the patentee or his assignees or licensees"); United States v. Univis Lens
Co., 316 U.S. 241, 250 (1942) (finding that the "sale of [a patented article] exhausts the monopoly in
that article and the patentee may not thereafter, by virtue of his patent, control the use or
disposition of the article").
29 See Bandag, Inc. v. Al Bolser's Tire Stores, Inc., 750 F.2d 903, 924-25 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (noting
that the "relatively few instances where implied licenses have been found rely on the doctrine of
equitable estoppel" (quoting Stickle v. Heublein, Inc., 716 F.2d 1550, 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1983)); Met-Coil
Sys. Corp. v. Korners Unlimited, Inc., 803 F.2d 684, 686-87 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (applying the equityimplied license test formulated in Bandagto find an implied license in the manufacturer of parts for
use in the plaintiffs patented process for forming flanges on the ends of metal air ducts);
Carborundum Co. v. Molten Metal Equip. Innovations, Inc., 72 F.3d 872, 877-80 (Fed. Cir. 1995)
(applying the equity-implied license test formulated in Bandag to find an implied license in the
manufacture of parts for use in plaintiffs patented molten metal pumping assembly).
30 See Aro , 365 U.S. 336, 345-46 (1961) (finding that the doctrine of permissible repair permits
purchasers of a patented combination made under license to repair or replace worn elements of the
combination unless the repair or replacement would constitute impermissible reconstruction of the
combination); Are 1I, 377 U.S. 476, 488-91, 492-93 (1964) (finding company who repaired worn
parts in unlicensed patented combinations guilty of contributory infringement).
'31The nomenclature devised to characterize these three forms of implied license is solely for
convenient reference throughout this comment.
32 448 U.S. 176, 201 (1980).
33Anton/Bauer, Inc. v. PAG, Ltd., 329 F.3d 1343, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2003), -reh'gandreh'gen
bane
denied.
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license analysis, Anton/Bauer would have been correctly decided in favor of the
34
appellee, Anton/Bauer, even in light of a permissible repair defense.

II. THE DOCTRINE OF IMPLIED LICENSE
This section will begin by introducing the concept of implied license (the modern
"sword") and three doctrines that can effect such a license. The discussion will
address the bases of United States Supreme Court jurisprudence relating to the
evolution of the exhaustion doctrine.3 5 The discussion will proceed from the doctrine's
Nineteenth Century inception, when it provided purchasers with the right to use and
sell a patented article,3 6 to its expanded Twentieth Century incarnation, which has
facilitated findings allowing certain parties to practice a patent after the purchase of
only an unpatented constituent.3 7 This section also will discuss the case in which the
CAFC developed its equity-implied license analysis after finding the exhaustion
doctrine inapposite.38 Finally, this section will conclude by discussing two related
cases that collectively set forth the Supreme Court's most recent articulation of the
3 9
doctrine of permissible repair.

34 The district court in Anton/Bauoer thoroughly contemplated PAG's doctrine of permissible
repair defense and ruled definitively in favor of Anton/Bauer. See Anton/Bauer, Inc. v. PAG, Ltd.,
No. Civ.A. 3:01CV577 (CFD), 2002 WL 1359673, at *4-7 (D. Conn. June 13, 2002). However, the
CAFC declined even to address the defense. Anton/Bauer, 329 F.3d at 1349 n.2. On appeal, PAG's
primary defense was based on the doctrine of implied license; and, "if it applie[d] .... the doctrine of
permissible repair." Id. at 1349. However, in a footnote, the CAFC stated that "[in light of [its]
disposition of [the] case and in light of the fact that the parties both [took] the position that the
doctrine of permissible repair [did] not apply [on appeal], [it would] not address the doctrine." Id. at
1349 n.2.
The fact that Anton/Bauer would join PAG in conceding the doctrine to be inapplicable on
appeal is somewhat odd. A large section of the district court's opinion is devoted to discussing the
doctrine of permissible repair (nearly 3 of 8 full pages). Anton/Bauer, 2002 WL 1359673, at *4-7.
However, the district court seems to have misapplied the CAFC's implied license test, which the
district court found largely inapplicable to the case. See Anton/Bauer, 329 F.3d at 1350-51 (finding
an implied license as to PAG after "PAG argue[d] that the district court improperly applied the
implied license test laid out" in CAFC precedent).
Given the ultimate outcome of the district court's decision, with its strong conclusion against
PAG's permissible repair defense, it is possible, though purely speculative, that in preparing for
PAG's appeal, Anton/Bauer realized that PAG would seize on the district court's mistake as to the
doctrine of implied license. Likewise, it is understandable that PAG would choose to focus on the
doctrine of implied license and be content when the CAFC decided to ignore any defense relying on
the doctrine of permissible repair. Nonetheless, because PAG likely would have felt otherwise had
the CAFC applied the implied license analysis proposed in this comment, a discussion of how PAG
also might have lost an appeal defended with the doctrine of permissible repair is considered to be
within the scope of this comment.
3 The "exhaustion" doctrine is also known as the "first sale" doctrine. Soo, e.g., McDonald's
Corp. v. Shop at Home, Inc., 82 F. Supp. 2d 801, 811 (M.D. Tenn. 2000).
'36 See cases cited infra note 58.
37 United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241, 248-52 (1942).
'38 Bandag, Inc. v. Al Bolser's Tire Stores, Inc., 750 F.2d 903, 924 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
3 Aro , 365 U.S. 336 (1961); Aro I1 377 U.S. 476 (1964).
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An alleged patent infringer can defend himself by asserting that he acted under
a license.40 This is because upon granting a license to a third party, the patentee
waives his right to exclude that party from making, using, or selling the patented
subject matter to the extent dictated by the terms of the license. 41 Furthermore, a
license may be in the form of an express agreement or implied from the factual
circumstances surrounding the parties' interactions. 42 Thus, where a court finds that
an accused infringer has an implied license to practice an allegedly infringed patent,
43
the accused party cannot be liable for direct infringement under § 271(a).
Accordingly, where a court finds an implied license for an accused infringer's
customers to practice the allegedly infringed patent, the accused party "cannot be
liable for either inducement of infringement [under § 271(b)] or contributory
44
infringement" under § 271(c).
The Supreme Court first blessed the doctrine of implied license as a de facto
defense to patent infringement in the 1843 case of MeC]urg v. Kngs]and,45 which
turned on a form of implied license now known as a "shop right."46 Since MeC]urg,
47
the doctrine of implied license has expanded to encompass many other scenarios.
Implied licenses have been found to provide (1) a defense to the willfulness element
of infringement (where an alleged infringer believes that he possesses an implied
license and a court finds that belief to be reasonable);48 (2) the right for a buyer of a
patented article to use the article freely for its life and sell it if he so chooses; 49 (3) the
right for a buyer of an unpatented material 5 or apparatus 51 to practice the patented
process in which that item is used; (4) the right for a buyer of an unpatented
component of a patented combination to practice the patent in which that item is

40Anton/Bauer, Inc. v. PAG, Ltd., 329 F.3d 1343, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
41

Id.

Id. See also Wang Labs., Inc. v. Mitsubishi Elecs. Am., Inc., 103 F.3d 1571, 1580 (Fed. Cir.
1997) (stating that in the context of "patent law, an implied license merely signifies a patentee's
waiver of the statutory right to exclude others from making, using, or selling the patented
invention").
43See Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 186 (1980).
41Anton/Bauor,329 F.3d at 1350.
45 42 U.S. (1 How.) 202 (1843).
46 See PPG Indus., Inc. v. Guardian Indus. Corp., 597 F.2d 1090, 1094 (6th Cir. 1979) (stating
that a "shop right is an implied license which accrues to an employer in cases where an [employeepatentee] has perfected a patentable device while working for the employer").
47Wang Labs., 103 F.3d at 1580. "[C]ourts and commentators relate that implied licenses arise
by acquiescence, by conduct, by equitable estoppel (estoppel in pais), or by legal estoppel." Id. Thus,
judicial attempts to catalog the scenarios in which an implied license can be found have generally
produced at least four specific situations of legal significance. See id.
48See State Contracting & Eng'g Corp. v. Condotte Am., Inc., 346 F.3d 1057, 1064-65 (Fed. Cir.
2003) (finding that under the unique circumstances of the case, the defendant's reasonable but
erroneous belief that it had an implied license to use the plaintiffs patented process was a defense to
the willfulness element of infringement).
4) Glass Equip. Dev., Inc. v. Besten, Inc., 174 F.3d 1337, 1342 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (discussing
the "first sale" doctrine).
50See Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 186 (1980) (finding that customers
who purchased a certain chemical from the respondent could use the respondent's patented process,
"without fear of being sued for direct infringement [under § 271(a)], by virtue of an implied license").
51Met-Coil Sys. Corp. v. Korners Unlimited, Inc., 803 F.2d 684, 687 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (finding
that the plaintiffs sale of an unpatented machine useful only in practicing the plaintiffs patented
process conferred an implied license for purchasers to practice the patent).
42
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used; 52 and (5) the right to repair unpatented components of a patented article,
provided that doing so does not constitute an effective reconstruction of the patented
article.53 The following sections will examine the various doctrines that have given
rise to the forms of implied license pertinent to this comment: the exhaustion-implied
license, the equity-implied license, and the repair-implied license.

A. The Exhaustion Doctrine

1. Adams: The HistoricalExhaustion Doctrine
The fundamental tenet of the historical 54 exhaustion doctrine is that once a
patentee conveys an article embodying his patented invention, he parts with his
ability to control the future use and sale of that article. 55 Thus, any conveyance of a
patented invention provides the purchaser with an exhaustion-implied license to use
or resell that invention. 56 Although Adams v. Burke57 was not likely the first case in
52 Carborundum Co. v. Molten Metal Equip. Innovations, Inc., 72 F.3d 872, 877-80 (Fed. Cir.
1995) (finding that the plaintiffs sale of an unpatented machine useful only in practicing the
plaintiffs patented combination conferred an implied license for purchasers to practice the patent).
Cf Leeds & Catlin Co. v. Victor Talking Mach. Co., 213 U.S. 325, 332-37 (1909) (finding that the
defendant did not have an implied license to manufacture and sell an unpatented but essential
component of the plaintiffs patented combination). In Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Investment
Co., 320 U.S. 661 (1944) [hereinafter Me-reoidlA (finding the plaintiffs attempt to control the sales of
an unpatented but essential element of his patented combination to be patent misuse), '[t]he Court
recognized that its reasoning directly conflicted with [the Leeds & Catlin decision], and it registered
disapproval, if not outright rejection, of that case." Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S.
176, 197 (1980). However, in Dawson, after an extensive examination of the legislative history
behind § 271, the Court found that "the [Leeds & Catlin] decision ... was placed before Congress as
an example of the kind of contributory infringement action [that § 271(c)] would allow." 448 U.S. at
215.
5
3 Aro ,365 U.S. 336, 342-43 (1961) (discussing the doctrine of "permissible repair").
54 There is only one true exhaustion doctrine: that which was articulated by the Supreme Court
in Adams v.Burke, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 453, 456-57 (1873). However, the Supreme Court's holding in
Univis expanded the scope of the exhaustion doctrine to include certain unpatented intermediate
elements of patented inventions. See United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241, 248-52 (1942).
Thus, it is useful to differentiate between the historicalexhaustion doctrine articulated in Adams,
and the expanded exhaustion doctrine articulated in Univis.
55
Adams, 84 U.S. at 456.
56 See id. Under the exhaustion doctrine, a sale of a patented invention carries with it the
freedom for the buyer to use or resell that invention. Id. That freedom is essentially an implied
license for buyers to conduct those activities. See Mark D. Janis, A Tale of the Apocryphal Axe.*
Repair,Reconstruction, and the Implied License in IntellectualProperty Law, 58 MD. L. REV. 423,
494-95 (1999). "[U]pon the unconditional, authorized sale of patented goods, the purchaser takes a
license to use (and resell) the goods. Because the license is not formalized in any express written
agreement, it can be referred to as an implied license." Id. Moreover, "[t]he [Supreme Court's]
statements in Univis demonstrate how closely related the exhaustion doctrine is to the grant of an
implied license. Indeed, they suggest that an implied license stems from the exhaustion of a patent
right." Anton/Bauer, Inc. v. PAG, Ltd., 329 F.3d 1343, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2003), _reh'gandreh'genbane
denied Because this comment primarily is concerned with implied licenses as to unpatented
components of patented inventions, the exhaustion-implied license that arises in the historical
exhaustion doctrine context is a point of focus only in passing.
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which the exhaustion principle arose, Adams was the first case in which the Supreme
Court applied the doctrine in conjunction with an explicit articulation of enduring
58
eloquence.
In Adams, the plaintiff was the assignee of a patent pertaining to an improved
coffin lid.5 9 The assignment to Adams was subject to a geographical limitation such
that his rights to the patent were only valid within a radius of ten miles from Boston,
Massachusetts. 60 Adams brought suit against Burke after he discovered that Burke
had used the invention in a town seventeen miles from Boston. 61 Burke claimed,
62
however, that he had purchased the invention in Boston, from Adams' assignee.
The Court found that regardless of the geographical limitation on Adams' rights to
make and sell the invention, after it had been sold, the purchaser, Burke, acquired
an implied license to use the invention without any similar restriction. 63 As a result,
64
the Court affirmed the lower court's dismissal of Adams' complaint.

57 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 453 (1873).
58 See Bloomer v. McQuewan, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 539, 549 (1852) (holding that an "inventor
might lawfully sell [his invention] to [any purchaser], whether [the inventor] had a patent or not, if
no other patentee stood in his way," and that "when the [invention] passes to the hands of the
purchaser, it is no longer within the limits of the [patent] monopoly"); See also Chaffee v. Boston
Belting Co., 63 U.S. (22 How.) 217, 223 (1859) (holding that "[w]hen the patented machine rightfully
passes to the hands of the purchaser from the patentee, or from any other person by him authorized
to convey it, the machine is no longer within the limits of the [patent] monopoly"); Bloomer v.
Millinger, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 340, 350 (1863) (holding that "when a patentee has himself constructed
[his] machine and sold it, or authorized another to construct and sell it, or to construct and use and
operate it, and the consideration has been paid to him for the right, he has then to that extent
parted with his monopoly"); Mitchell v. Hawley, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 544, 547 (1872) (holding that
"when [a patentee] has . . . constructed [his] machine and sold it without any conditions, or
authorized another to construct, sell, and deliver it, or to construct and use and operate it, without
any conditions, and [he has received] consideration ...

for the thing patented ...

[he has] parted...

with all his exclusive right[s]").
59 84 U.S. at 453-54. The assignment conveyed "all the right, title, and interest which the ...
patentees had in the invention." Id. at 454. The patentees, of course, had "the exclusive right of
making, using, and [selling] to others to be used, the [patented] improvement." Id.
60

Jd

( Id.
62 Id. at 454-55. The assignment from the patentee, Merrill & Horner, to Adams' assignee,
Lockhart & Seelye, was subject to the same geographical limitation as was the assignment to
Adams. Id. at 454.
63 See Adams, 84 U.S. at 456-57. The Adams decision dealt only with a purchaser's right to use
a patented invention without regard to limitations on the rights of the seller. Id. Subsequently,
however, in Keeler v. Standard Folding Bed Co., 157 U.S. 659, 664 (1895), the Supreme Court
interpreted Adams as also providing a right for a purchaser to sell a patented invention without
regard to limitations on the rights of the seller. In Keeler,the Court stated that
the legal significance of the decision upholding [Burke's (the defendant in Adams)]
defense is that a person who buys patented articles from a person who has a right
to sell, though within a restricted territory, has a right to use and sell such
articles in all and any part of the United States; that, when the royalty had once
been paid to a party entitled to receive [it], the patented article then becomes the
absolute, unrestricted property of the purchaser, with the right to sell it as an
essentialincidentofsuch ownershp.
Keeler, 157 U.S. at 664 (emphasis added).
64 Adams, 84 U.S. at 457.
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2. Univis: The Expandect 5 Exhaustion Doctrine
The Supreme Court decided United States v. Univis Lens Co.66 in 1942,
approximately ten years before the passage of the Patent Act of 1952, in which §§
271(c) and 271(d) were enacted.67 Univis added a subtle twist to the historical
exhaustion doctrine articulated in Adams. Univis expanded the doctrine's breadth
such that when a patentee first sells an article that is alone useless or incomplete
unless it is used or completed in accordance with his patent, whether that articleis
68
patentedor not, his patent monopoly is exhausted "with respect to the article sold."
Thus, when such an article is sold, the purchaser acquires an exhaustion-implied
69
license to practice seller's patent.
In Univis, the primary issue was whether Univis' scheme for licensing various
patent rights violated the Sherman Antitrust Act.70 However, the sub-issue
concerning whether and when Univis parted with its patent monopoly is germane
here. 71 Univis Lens Co. (the "Lens Company") was a subsidiary and licensee of the
6 See supra text accompanying note 54.
GG316 U.S. 241 (1942).
6 35 U.S.C. §§ 271(c), (d) (2000). This may explain why the Univis decision seems to wholly
ignore the rights now protected by § 27 1(c).
68 Univis, 316 U.S. at 249. Historically, exhaustion doctrine cases dealt with sales of patented
inventions, not with sales of unpatented elements of patented inventions or processes. See Adams,
84 U.S. at 456-57; supra text accompanying notes 54, 58. At least one court recognized this
distinction when it stated that "[t]he patent exhaustion doctrine is so strong that it applies even to
an incomplete product that has no substantial use other than to be further manufactured into a
completed patented and allegedly infringing article." Cyrix Corp. v. Intel Corp., 846 F. Supp. 522,
540 (E.D. Tex. 1994). See also Minebea Co. v. Papst, 13 F. Supp. 2d 35, 44 (D.D.C. 1998) (stating
that "[o]ne aspect of the patent exhaustion doctrine provides that when a patent holder sells 'an
incomplete product that has no substantial use other than to be further manufactured into a
completed patented and allegedly infringing article,' the patent holder cannot claim that the final
product infringes his patent" (quoting Cyrix, 846 F. Supp. at 540)).
(3 See Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 186 (1980) (citing Univis for the
proposition that sales of a chemical useful only in practicing the seller's patented process also
conveyed an implied license to practice the process). See Anton/Bauer, Inc. v. PAG, Ltd., 329 F.3d
1343, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (interpreting Univis to indicate "that an implied license stems from the
exhaustion of a patent right"). See also cases cited infra note 234 (showing judicial disagreement as
to whether Univis is really an implied license case). It is this form of exhaustion-implied license,
that which arises as to unpatented components or elements of patented combinations or processes,
respectively, with which this comment is primarily concerned.
0 Univis, 316 U.S. at 243. The provisions at issue in Univis were §§ 1 and 3 of the Sherman
Antitrust Act, Univis, 316 U.S. at 243, which was promulgated in 1890, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2000)
(collectively known as the Sherman Antitrust Act). Section 1 provides that "[e]very contract,
combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce
among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal." 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).
Section 3 provides:
Every contract, combination in form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce in any Territory of the United States or of the
District of Columbia, or in restraint of trade or commerce between any such
Territory and another, or between any such Territory or Territories and any State
or States or the District of Columbia, or with foreign nations, or between the
District of Columbia and any State or States or foreign nations, is declared illegal.
15 U.S.C. § 3(a) (2002).
71 Univis, 316 U.S. at 248.
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Univis Corporation (the "Corporation").72 "The Corporation license[d] the Lens
Company to manufacture [and sell] lens blanks. ' 73 The lens blanks were "rough
opaque pieces of glass . . . composed of two or more pieces of glass of different
refractive power." 74 After the blanks were made, the Lens Company sold them to the

Corporation's "finishing" licensees, who would grind and polish the blanks into
finished "multifocal lenses [for use] in eyeglasses." 75 The Corporation held a patent
that covered both the method used by the Lens Company to make the blanks and the
steps necessary for finishing the blanks. 76 The grant of "finishing" licenses was
conditioned on the finishers' agreement to adhere to resale prices set by the
77
Corporation.
The district court 78 had found that the patent claims related to a finished lens
and that only licensed finishers could avoid infringement. 79 As a result, the court
upheld that portion of Univis' licensing scheme which prescribed the conditions
under which a "finishing" license would be granted.80 On appeal,8 1 the Supreme

Id. at 243.
73 Id.
72

71 Id. at 244.
75 Id. By the terms of the license agreement, the Lens Company had to pay the Corporation a
set royalty of fifty cents per pair of lens blanks sold. Id. The Corporation's licensing scheme
permitted the blanks to be sold to "three classes" of licensees: wholesalers, prescription retailers,
and finishing retailers. Id. A wholesaler's license permitted the licensee to grind and polish the
blanks into finished lenses according to the needs of the licensed prescription retailers' customers.
Id. The price at which the finished lenses were sold to the prescription retailers was controlled by
the Corporation. Id. Because the prescription retailers did not finish their own lens blanks, the
license conferred to them granted a "franchise to prescribe [and] fit Univis lenses' in return for an
agreement "to sell finished lenses only to consumers and only at prices prescribed by the
corporation." Id. at 245. A finishing retailer's license was essentially the same as a wholesaler's
license, the difference being that finishing retailers ground and polished the blanks into finished
lenses according to the needs of their own customers. Id. at 244. As with the wholesalers, the price
at which the finished lenses were sold to the finishing retailers' customers was controlled by the
Corporation. Id. In spite of this elaborate licensing scheme, the Corporation's only royalty was the
fifty cents that the Lens Company was required to remunerate for each pair of lens blanks that it
sold. Id at 245. Nonetheless, under threat of cancellation for "price cutters," the license agreements
allowed the Corporation to control the sale prices of the lens blanks and the finished lenses at every
level at which each was sold. Id. at 244-45.
76 Id. at 248. Whether the Corporation actually held a single "all-encompassing" patent for both
stages of the lens manufacturing process is unclear in both the district court, United States v.
Univis Lens Co., 41 F. Supp. 258 (S.D.N.Y. 1941), and Supreme Court decisions, United States v.
Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241 (1942). However, on appeal to the Supreme Court, Univis conceded
that "the invention of only a single lens patent [was] utilized in making each blank and finishing it
as a lens." Id. at 248. As a result, the Court "assume[d] .... without deciding, that the patent [was]
not fully practiced until the finishing licensee . . . ground and polished the blank so that it [would]
serve its purpose as a lens." Id. at 248-49.
77 Id. at 244-45.
78 United States v. Univis Lens Co., 41 F. Supp. 258 (S.D.N.Y. 1941).
79 Univis, 316 U.S. at 247.
80 Id. Specifically, the district court concluded that "the Corporation could condition its licenses
upon" the licensees' agreement to maintain and adhere to retail prices dictated by the corporation.
Id. However, the district court struck down the prescription retailer license agreements that enabled
the Corporation to control the resale price of the finished lenses sold by the prescription retailer to
its customers. Id.
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Court found that "each blank ... embodie[d] essential features of the patented device
and [was] without utility until it [was] ground and polished as the finished lens of the
patent."8 2 Thus, "the only use to which [a lens blank] could be put and the only object
8
of [its] sale" was for the blank to be finished into a lens.

3

The Court held that any sale of an article, "whether patented or unpatented,
[confers] the right to use and sell [that article]."84 As a result, where such "an article .
. . is capable of use only in practicing [a] patent," the sale constitutes "a
relinquishment of the patent monopoly with respect to the item sold."85 Thus,

notwithstanding the Corporation's licensing scheme, when the Lens Company sold
lens blanks to finishing licensees, the sale itself was "both a complete transfer of
ownership of the blank . . . and a license to practice the final stage of the patent

procedure."8 6 The Court's analysis

8I The district court had "grant[ed] in part and den[ied] in part the [United States'] prayer for
an injunction" to halt Univis' licensing scheme. Univis, 316 U.S. at 242-43. Subsequently, the
United States appealed directly to the Supreme Court, and Univis cross-appealed on the same issue.
Id.
82 Id. at 249.
8:3Jjd
84
85

Id.

d. The Court culled this proposition from its decisions in Leitch Manufacturing. Co. v. Barber

Co., 302 U.S. 458 (1938) and B.B. Chemical Co. v. Elkis, 314 U.S. 495 (1942). Univis, 316 U.S. at 249
(citing Leitch and B.B. Chemical. In Leitch, Barber was the owner of a patent that covered a
method of using a bituminous coal emulsion to retard evaporation during the curing of concrete road
surfaces. 302 U.S. at 460. Both Barber and Leitch manufactured the emulsion, and it was held to be
a widely used, staple article of commerce. Id. Barber sued Leitch for contributory infringement after
Leitch sold its own emulsion to a road builder who used it to practice Barber's patented process. Id.
at 459-460. Barber did not grant written licenses to use its patented method, but the Court found
that Barber's method of doing business was such that the law granted permission to do so to those
who purchased the coal emulsion from it. Id. at 460-61. Moreover, in bringing suit against Leitch for
contributory infringement, the Court stated that Barber was seeking to use its patent "to secure a
limited monopoly in the business of producing and selling" the emulsion. Id. at 460. The Court found
this to be a prohibited attempt to "extend the [patent] monopoly to unpatented material used in
practicing the invention." Id. at 463. Thus, as pertinent to the analysis in Univis, Leitch stands for
the proposition that the rights to use a patented process flow along with the patentee's sale of an
unpatentedstaple article ofcommerce used to perform that process. See id. at 460.
In B.B. Chemical, B.B. Chemical was the owner of a patent that covered a method "of
reinforcing insoles in shoe manufacture." 314 U.S. at 496. The patented method required a strip of
fabric reinforcing material to be coated in rubber and attached to shoe insoles with an adhesive. Id.
B.B. Chemical supplied pre-coated reinforcing material to various shoe manufacturers. Id. The
manufacturers could provide their own fabric to be coated or simply pay an extra fee for B.B.
Chemical to supply it for them. Id. at 496, 497. B.B. Chemical also supplied the necessary adhesive,
as well as patented machines to facilitate its application. Id. at 496-97. Moreover, B.B. Chemical did
not grant written licenses to practice its patented process to those who purchased the coated fabric
from it. Id. at 497. As a result, under Leitch, the lower courts had found-and the Supreme Court
affirmed-that B.B. Chemical's "sale to manufacturers of the unpatented materials for use by the
patented method operated as a license to use the patent with that material alone." Id. Thus, as
pertinent to the analysis in Univis, B.B. Chemical stands for the proposition that the rights to use a
patented process flow along with the patentee's sale ofany unpatonted artiele used to perform that
process. B.B. Chemical,314 U.S. at 497-98.
86 Univis, 316 U.S. at 249.
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[led] to the conclusion that where one has sold an uncompleted article
which, because it embodies essential features of his patented invention, is
within the protection of his patent, and has destined the article to be
finished by the purchaser in conformity to the patent, he has sold his
87
invention so far as it is or may be embodied in that particular article.
Thus, the Court held that any sale of the lens blank provided the purchaser with an
exhaustion-implied license to practice the Corporation's patent and finish the blank
88
into a complete lens.

B. Bandag: The Doctrine ofEquitableEstoppel
In Bandag, Inc. v. A] Bolser/s Tire Stores, Inc., the CAFC relied in part on the
doctrine of equitable estoppel8 9 to develop its two-part equity-implied license
analysis. 90 In the context of patent law, the doctrine of equitable estoppel holds that
where, as a result of certain conduct by a patentee, 91 an alleged infringer has been
led to take some action (i.e., to commit the allegedly infringing act), has committed

87 Id. at

250-51.
See id."Sale of a lens blank by the patentee or by his licensee is thus in itself both a complete
transfer of ownership of the blank, which is within the protection of the patent law, and a license to
practice the final stage of the patent procedure." Id. The court also condemned the Corporation's
practice of conditioning the grant of finishing licenses on the licensees' agreement to sell the finished
lenses at fixed prices. Id. As such, the Court found that aspect of the Corporation's licensing scheme
to be an impermissible extension of its patent monopoly and an illegal restraint of trade under the
88

Sherman Antitrust Act. Univis, 316 U.S. at 252-54.
8)BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 14, at 551. In general, "'[e]stoppel'means that [a] party
is prevented by his own acts from claiming a right to [the] detriment of [another] party who was
entitled to rely on such conduct and has acted accordingly. Id. There are two primary forms of
estoppel: equitable and legal. Wang Labs., Inc. v. Mitsubishi Elecs. Am., Inc., 103 F.3d 1571, 1581
(Fed. Cir. 1997). "[A] typical equitable estoppel situation [is] one in which (1) the infringer knows of
the patent, (2) the patentee objects to the infringer's activities, (3) but the patentee does not seek
relief until much later, (4) thereby misleading the infringer to believe the patentee will not act."
WangLabs., 103 F.3d at 1581. In contrast, [l]egal estoppel refers to a narrower category of conduct
encompassing scenarios where a patentee has licensed or assigned a right, received consideration,
and then sought to derogate from the right granted." Id.
90750 F.2d 903, 925 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
91 In a pure equitable estoppel analysis, such conduct may include the patentee's affirmative
actions or lack thereof, for example, remaining silent on an issue when he should have spoken. See,
e.g., Mitchell v. McIntee, 514 P.2d 1357, 1359 (Or. App. 1973) (defining equitable estoppel as "the
doctrine by which a person may be precluded by his act or conduct, or silence when it is his duty to
speak, from asserting a right which he otherwise would have had"). However,
[t]he primary difference between the estoppel analysis in implied license cases
and the analysis in equitable estoppel cases is that implied license looks for an
affirmative grant of consent or permission to make, use, or sell: i.e., a license.
Equitable estoppel, on the other hand, focuses on "misleading" conduct suggesting
that the patentee will not enforce patent rights.
Wang Labs., 103 F.3d at 1581 (citation omitted).
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himself to taking that action, and then does, in fact, take that action, the patentee is
92
estopped from claiming infringement.
In Bandag, Bandag, Inc., a franchiser of tire-retreading facilities, sued Al
Bolser's Tire Stores, Inc. ("Bolser") for direct infringement. 93 The suit arose after
Bolser purchased unpatented equipment 94 used in Bandag's patented tire recapping
process 95 from one of Bandag's former franchisees. 96 The district court had found that
Bolser was not an infringer "because the sequence of events by which it had obtained
the equipment . . . conferred on Bolser an implied license to use that equipment in
97
the patented process."
The CAFC found that the expanded exhaustion doctrine articulated in Univis
was inapplicable "because the claims [in Bandag's] patent [were] directed to a
'method of retreading' and [could not] read on the equipment" Bolser had used to
practice the patented process. 98 Moreover, the CAFC found two reasons for which
Bolser failed to meet its burden of proving that it had an implied license: 99 first, the
equipment that Bolser purchased had other noninfringing uses, 100 and second, the
circumstances [of the equipment's sale to Bolser did not] plainly indicate that the
92 Soo Stickle v. Heublein, Inc., 716 F.2d 1550, 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (stating that "[o]ne
common thread in cases in which equitable estoppel applies is that the actor committed himself to
act, and indeed acted, as a direct consequence of another's conduct"). Note that "[n]either [the
CAFC] nor the Supreme Court . . . has required a formal finding of equitable estoppel as a
prerequisite to a legal conclusion of implied license ....
Rather the estoppel doctrines serve as
guidelines." WangLabs., 103 F.3d at 1581 (citation omitted).
93 750 F.2d at 906. Bandag also charged Bolser with trademark infringement and unfair
competition as a result of Bolser's usage of one of Bandag's registered trademarks or service marks
in a Yellow Pages telephone directory. Id. at 907. Bandag claimed that Bolser's Yellow Pages
advertisement "misrepresented Bolser as a Bandag franchisee." Id. The CAFC affirmed Bolser's
liability as to both claims. Id. at 916.
94 Id.
at 923. "Though some of the equipment had been manufactured by Bandag, none was
covered by the ... patent [because] the claims of that patent were directed to a method." Id.
95 Because there was some ambiguity in the district court's characterization of the patent at
issue, the CAFC determined that "the protected invention of the ... patent is, as a matter of law, a
method." Id. at 922.
9c Id. at 906.
97 Id. at 922.
98 Id. at 924. Cf Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 186 (1980) (applying the
Univis implied license standard to a mothod of applying an herbicidal chemical). However, unlike in
Bandag where the claims of the method patent at issue were not directed to the specific equipment
used by the alleged infringer, 750 F.2d at 922-24, 926 app. B, in Dawson, the claims of the method
patent at issue wero directed to the specific chemical used by the alleged infringer, 448 U.S. at 182.
9 Bandag 750 F.2d at 924. "In a suit for patent infringement, the burden of proving the
establishment of an implied license falls upon the defendant. The evidence provided by Bolser to
meet this burden fail[ed] in at least two respects." Id. (citation omitted).
100 d. "[N]o license can be implied, where as here, the equipment involved has other
noninfringing uses, even if only as replacement parts." Id. The district court had found that the
equipment that Bolser had purchased, if modified, could have been used to practice processes that
did not infringe Bandag's patent. Id. at 923-24. However, the CAFC noted that "the district court
found only that modification was required to escape infringement without further addressing the
business reasonableness of doing so." Id. at 924. Nonetheless, the CACF considered the fact that
modification was possible in its determination that the equipment did have noninfringing uses. Id.
at 925. The CAFC also accorded weight to the likelihood that Bolser could have resold the
equipment used in the patented process or waited to use the equipment until Bandag's patent
expired. Id.
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grant of a license should be inferred. 10 1 As a result, the CAFC reversed the district
court and found that Bolser did not have an implied license to practice Bandag's
patented process. 10 2 In subsequent cases, the same two factors that precluded a
finding of an implied license in Bandag have become the elements necessary for the
103
CAFC to find an equity-implied license.

C. The Doctrine of PermissibleRepair
In the Aro cases, discussed below, the Supreme Court provided its most recent
articulation of the doctrine of permissible repair. 10 4 The doctrine of permissible repair
applies to patented combinations of unpatented elements. 10 5 The doctrine holds that
upon purchasing a patented machine or apparatus, the purchaser acquires the right
to repair worn components of the machine or apparatus, providing that the repair is
not so extensive as to constitute an infringing reconstruction of the patented
10 7
device. 10 6 This right is the repair-implied license.
101 Id. "Bolser's attempt to make out the defense of an implied license fails in a second respect..
'A mere sale does not import a license except where the circumstances plainly indicate that the
grant of a license should be inferred."' Id. (quoting Hunt v. Armour & Co., 185 F.2d 722, 729 (7th
Cir. 1950)).
102 Id. at 926.
103 See Met-Coil Sys. Corp. v. Korners Unlimited, Inc., 803 F.2d 684, 686 (Fed. Cir. 1986);
Carborundum Co. v. Molten Metal Equip. Innovations, Inc., 72 F.3d 872, 878 (Fed. Cir. 1995);
Anton/Bauer, Inc. v. PAG, Ltd., 329 F.3d 1343, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2003), rehgandrehgenbane denied.
101Aro1 365 U.S. 336 (1961); AroI, 377 U.S. 476 (1964).
105 Aro j 365 U.S. at 339, 342-46. A patentedcomponent of a patented combination would not
be subject to the doctrine of permissible repair. Id. at 339-40. However, the doctrine would apply to
any of the patented component's unpatented subcomponents. Id. at 339, 342-46.
106 Aro i, 365 U.S. at 345-46. One of the Supreme Court's earliest articulations of the doctrine of
permissible repair occurred in 1850, in the case of Wilson v. Simpson, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 109 (1850).
In Wilson, the Court found that a purchaser of the plaintiffs patented wood-planing machine did not
infringe the patent by replacing worn cutting blades. Id. at 123-26. The Court stated that "repairing
partial injuries [to a patented device], whether they occur from accident or from wear and tear, is
only refitting a machine for use. And it is no more than that, though it shall be a replacement of an
essential part of a combination." Id. at 123. Then, in distinguishing permissible repair from
infringing reconstruction, the Court stated that
if, as a whole, [the patented device] should happen to be broken, so that its parts
could not be readjusted, or so much worn out as to be useless, then a purchaser
cannot make or replace it by another, but he must buy a new one. The doing of
either would be entire reconstruction.
Id. at 124. In a more recent statement regarding the threshold of applicability for the doctrine of
permissible repair, the CAFC stated that "the standard for permissible repair is not limited to parts
that are worn out or broken, but instead extends to 'readily replaceable' parts." Anton/Bauer, 329
F.3d at 1352 n.4 (citing Husky Injection Molding Sys. v. R & D Tool & Eng'g Co., 291 F.3d 780, 78788 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
107 See Aro i, 365 U.S. at 345-46. Under the doctrine of permissible repair, a sale of a patented
invention carries with it the freedom for the buyer to repair components of that invention as they
become worn. Id. That freedom is essentially an implied license for buyers to conduct such repairs.
See Universal Elecs., Inc. v. Zenith Elecs. Corp., 846 F. Supp. 641, 645 n.5 (equating the doctrine of
permissible repair to a license for the purchaser to maintain the working condition of a patented
invention). See also Mark D. Janis, A Tale of the Apocryphal Axe: Repair,Reconstruction, and the
Implied License in IntellectualPropertyLaw, 58 MD. L. REV. 423, 494-527 (1999) (advocating the
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1. Aro J: Repairof an Unpatented Component of a Licensed Patented Combination
In Aro I, the patentee, Convertible Top Replacement Co. ("CTR"), sued Aro
Manufacturing Co. ("Aro") for contributory infringement as a result of Aro's sales of
an unpatented fabric component of CTR's "convertible folding top," a patented
combination of unpatented components.10 8 This case specifically addressed those
patented combinations that had been made and sold by General Motors, one of CTR's
licensees. 109 Thus, the controlling issue was whether a purchaser of a car that
included a licensed embodiment of CTR's patented combination directly infringed
CTR's patent when he replaced the worn out fabric component. 110
On appeal, the Supreme Court found that the unpatented fabric had a much
shorter life than the other components in the patented combination."' Moreover,
CTR's "patent did not confer a monopoly over the fabric or its [specially designed]
shape."1 1 2 The Court found that there was no direct-and thus no contributoryinfringement because "[miere replacement of individual unpatented parts, one at a
time, whether of the same part repeatedly or different parts successively, is no more
than the lawful right of the owner to repair his property."113 The Court further
concluded "that reconstruction of a patented entity, comprised of unpatented
elements, is limited to such a true reconstruction of the entity as to 'in fact make a
new article' after the entity, viewed as a whole has become spent."114 Thus, under Aro
I, where a patented combination is purchased from a licensed seller, a repair-implied
license exists as to the purchaser because the sale conveys the right to repair
11 5
unpatented elements of the combination.

applicability and discussing the practical implications of using an implied license model to analyze
the permissible repair versus impermissible reconstruction distinction).
108 Aro j 365 U.S. at 337-40.
109 See Arc If 377 U.S. at 479 (noting that "[the Arm 11 decision dealt ...
only with [cars
manufactured by] General Motors and not with [those manufactured by] Ford").
110 Ao I 365 U.S. at 342. This issue was controlling because, as the Court stated, "it is settled
that if there is no direct infringement of a patent there can be no contributory infringement." Id. at
341.
111 Id. at 337-38. After a bench trial, the district court had found that Aro was guilty of
contributory infringement and "enjoined [Aro] from further manufacture, sale or use of [the]
replacement fabrics." Id. at 338. Thereafter, the court of appeals "held that replacement of the fabric
constituted reconstruction of the [patented] combination and thus infringed or contributorily
infringed [CTR's] patent." Id. The court of appeals reached that conclusion after deciding that 'the
life of the fabric is not so short, nor is the fabric so cheap, that we can safely assume that an owner
would rationally believe that in replacing it he was making only a minor repair."' Id. (quoting Aro
Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 270 F.2d 200, 202, 205 (1st Cir. 1959)).
112 Ao , 365 U.S. at 340.
11' Id. at 346.
11"Id. (quoting United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 425 (2d Cir. 1945)).
115 Ao 1 365 U.S. at 343-46. See also Amrc 1$ 377 U.S. 476, 479-80 (1964) (noting that "[the]
reconstruction-repair distinction is decisive . . . only when the replacement is made in a structure
whose original manufacture and sale have been licensed by the patentee").
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2. Aro 11: Repairof an Unpatented Component of an Unlicensed Patented
Combination
The facts of Apo II differ in essentially one key respect from the facts of Aro I
Unlike Aro I, where General Motors was licensed to incorporate the patented
"convertible folding top" combination into its cars, Aro II addressed the fact that
another automobile manufacturer, Ford, had incorporated into its cars unlicensed
versions of the patented combination. 116 As in Aro I,the patentee, CTR, sued Aro for
contributory infringement as a result of Aro's sales of the unpatented fabric
component of CTR's patented combination. 117 The issue in Aro II was thus "whether
Aro [was] liable for contributory infringement, under 35 U.S.C. § 271(c), with respect
11
to its manufacture and sale of replacement fabrics" for cars made by Ford. 8
On appeal to the Supreme Court, as in Aro , the threshold question was
whether owners of Ford cars, "by replacing the worn-out fabric element of the
patented [combination], committed direct infringement."1 19 The Court found that
because Ford was unlicensed, it lacked the "authority to make and sell" CTR's
patented combination and it could not, therefore, confer the right to use that
combination to its customers. 120 As a result, when Ford's customers repaired the
worn fabric element, they directly infringed the patented combination.121 The Court
then found that Aro knew its fabrics fit the definition of § 271(c) in that (1)they were
material parts of CTR's patented combination; (2) they were especially suited for an
infringing use; and (3) they were nonstaple articles of commerce.122 The Court also
found that Aro had "the requisite knowledge that the Ford tops were patented and
infringing." 123 Accordingly, the Court found Aro liable for contributory infringement

Aro 1, 377 U.S. at 478-80.
Id.at 479.
1S Id. at 481.
1" Id. at 483. After the Court's decision and remand in Aro I,the district court misinterpreted
116

117

Amro Ito require that CTR's case be dismissed as to both General Motors and Ford cars. Id at 480.
That decision failed to take into account the status of those manufacturers as respectively licensed
and unlicensed by CTR. Id. Subsequently, the court of appeals found that Aro was liable for
contributory infringement because Ford and its customers directly infringed the patent when they
respectively made and used CTR's patented combination. Id. at 482.
120 Id. at 483-84.
121 Id.at 484-85.
122 Id. at 487-88. "Aro's factory manager admitted that the fabric replacements in question not
only were specially designed for .. .Ford convertibles but would not, to his knowledge, fit the top
structures of any other cars." Id. at 488 n.7.
123 Id. at 488-91. The Court found that 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) required the alleged contributory
infringer, Aro, to have had knowledge that the part it was selling was 'especially made or ...
adapted for use"' in infringing CTR's patented combination. Id. at 488 (quoting 35 U.C.C. § 271(c)).
Moreover, under the circumstances of the case, the majority held that for Aro to be liable for
contributory infringement, it must have also known that the CTR's combination was patented and
that Ford's use of the combination was an infringement. Id.at 488. The minority, however, felt that
§ 271(c) required the alleged contributory infringer only to have "knowledge that the component was
especially designed for use in a combination and was not a staple article suitable for substantial
other use, and not knowledge that the combination was either patented or infringing." Id at 491 n.8.
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as to any replacement fabric components that it sold to Ford's customers. 124 Thus,
under Aro II, where a patented combination is purchased from an unlicensed seller, a
repair-implied license does not exist as to the purchaser because the sale does not
convey the right to repair unpatented elements of the combination.125

III. ANALYSIS
This section will discuss and compare two cases that present analogous
scenarios: Dawson, which involved a patentee's § 271(c) monopoly right as to the
manufacturing and sale of a nonstaple article that was a material part of its patented
proees; 126 and, Anton/Bauer, which involved a patentee's § 271(c) monopoly right as
to the manufacturing and sale of a nonstaple article that was a material part of its
1 27
patented combination.
While both scenarios are contemplated by the express
language of § 271(c), there exists a crucial difference between them. In the former,
the United States Supreme Court explicitly articulated and upheld the patentee's §
271(c) monopoly right.1 28 However, in the latter, the CAFC relied on the doctrine of
implied license to deny the same right.1 29 Accordingly, this section will also examine
the exhaustion-implied and equity-implied license analyses, discussed in Part II, as
they were applied in Anton/Bauer. It will be argued that under the unique
circumstances of that case, neither form of implied license was appropriate.

A. Dawson:A § 271 (e) Monopoly Right as to an Unpatentedbut EssentialElement of
a PatentedProeess
One fundamental difference between the introductory parable and its modern
equivalent, a contributory infringement suit, is that the issue in the former scenario
concerned which of the two women had a right to the entire baby. 130 The issue in the
121 d. at 491. Aro's liability was limited to those fabric sales that it made as to Ford cars before
July 21, 1955. Id. at 500. This was because on that date, Ford had executed a release with CTR's
assignee, the Automobile Research Corporation. Id. at 493.
125 See supra text accompanying note 115.

126 Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176 (1980).
127 Anton/Bauer, Inc. v. PAG, Ltd., 329 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2003), reh'g and reh'g en bane
denied.These particular scenarios have been chosen for discussion because each is representative of
one of the two classes of patents protected from contributory infringement by § 271(c). 35 U.S.C. §
271(c) (2000). One is the process class; that for which contributory infringement is proscribed as to
the sale of a material or apparatus that is both a nonstaple and material to performing a patented
process. Id. This protected class includes only patented processes and provides protection solely for
unpatented elements required for their practice. !-d. The other class is the combination class; that for
which contributory infringement is proscribed as to the sale of a material and nonstaple component
of various forms of patented combinations of unpatented elements and subelements. Id. This class
includes "patented machine[s], manufacturels], combination[s], or composition[s]" and provides
protection solely for unpatented elements required to practice patents that can be characterized as
fitting into one or more of those four categories. !-d. The process class was addressed in Dawson,
which discussed-but did not directly address-the combinationclass. See 448 U.S. 176.
128
129

130

Id.

Anton/Bauer, 329 F.3d 1343.
See 1 Kings 3:16-28.
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latter scenario, however, turns on a more preliminary and seemingly less difficult
question: whether the baby should be divided. Unlike the parable, where the answer
to this question was but a necessary precursor to justice, here it controls whether the
true mother, the patentee, will be permitted to keep her child: the § 271(c) monopoly
right.
In Dawson, the Supreme Court addressed the question of how the doctrine of
patent misuse affects a patentee's ability to recover against an alleged contributory
infringer.131 The primary issue before the Court was "whether the owner of a patent
[for] a chemical process [was] guilty of patent misuse"; and, if so, whether that party
was thus "barred from seeking relief against contributory infringement of its patent
rights, if it exploitded] the patent only in conjunction with the sale of an unpatented
article that constitute[d] a material part of the invention and [was] not suited for
commercial use outside the scope of the patent claims."

132

In deciding the case, the

Supreme Court recognized and articulated the unique right-the § 271(c) monopoly
right-possessed by certain patentees as a result of the counterbalancing provisions
of §§ 271(c) and 271(d).133
In Dawson, the petitioner, Dawson Chemical Co., appealed an adverse ruling
that came as a result of a patent infringement suit brought against it by the
respondent, Rohm & Haas Co.134 Rohm & Haas was the owner of U.S. Patent No.
3,816,092,135 (the '092 patent) which covered a process for applying the unpatented
131

Dawson, 448 U.S. at 179. Before both Dawson and the enactment of § 271, judicially-

developed doctrines similar to those codified in §§ 271(c) and 271(d) had been used and relied upon
with little guidance from the Supreme Court. Dawson, 448 U.S. at 179, 180. See also Motion Picture
Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917) (denying relief for infringement to a
patentee who made an illegal attempt to extend his patent monopoly to cover unpatented
components necessary to use the patented device). Section 271 was promulgated as a part of the
Patent Act of 1952, 28 years before Dawson was decided. Dawson, 448 U.S. at 179, 180. Congress'
purpose for enacting § 271 was "to codify certain aspects of the doctrines of contributory
infringement and patent misuse that had previously been developed by the judiciary." Dawson, at
179, 180.
1:32ITd
13 See id. at 201 (finding that "[t]he limitations on contributory infringement written into §
271(c) are counterbalanced by limitations on patent misuse in § 271(d) .... [Tihe provisions of §
271(d) effectively confer upon the patentee, as a lawful adjunct of-his patent rights, a limited power
to exclude others from competition in nonstaple goods." (emphasis added)).
13 Id at 183-85. The trial court granted summary judgment for Dawson after finding that
"Rohm & Haas was barred from obtaining relief against infringers of its patent because it had
attempted illegally to extend its patent monopoly" by refusing to grant licenses to use its patented
process. Id.at 183-84. See also Rohm & Haas Co. v. Dawson Chem. Co., 191 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 691
(S.D. Tex. 1976).
Subsequently, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the trial court's
decision. Dawson, 448 U.S. at 184-85. See also Rohm & Haas Co. v. Dawson Chem. Co., 599 F.2d
685 (5th Cir. 1979). The Court of Appeals found that the chemical required to practice Rohm &
Haas' patented process was a nonstaple article of commerce, of the type that § 271(c) was meant to
protect from contributory infringement. Dawson, 448 U.S. at 184-85. Thus, since Rohm & Haas'
refusal to license the use of its patented process "was designed to accomplish only what [§ 271]
contemplated, the [Court of Appeals] ruled that [Dawson's] misuse defense was of no avail." Dawson,
448 U.S. at 185.
135 The '092 patent issued to Rohm & Haas on July 11, 1974, after a prosecution period that
began in 1958. Id.at 181-82. During that time, the application that became the '092 patent was
involved in an interference proceeding in the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO).
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herbicide, propanil. 1 36 Both parties were chemical manufacturers that were capable
of making and selling propanil.137 Several years before Rohm & Haas obtained the
'092 patent, it was discovered that propanil "had properties that made it useful as a
'post-emergence' herbicide particularly well suited for the cultivation of rice." 138 Since

propanil could be sprayed on rice crops after they had begun to grow, it removed the
need "for hand weeding or flooding of the rice fields." 139 The claims of the '092 patent
covered the necessary rate and volume of propanil application per acre, as well as the
140
types of weeds killed and certain crops on which propanil could be used.

Id. at 182, 182 n.i. The purpose of the interference proceeding was to determine whether the
applicant for the Monsanto Company or the applicant for Rohm & Haas was "the first to invent the
process for using propanil [(the unpatented chemical at issue)] as a herbicide." Dawson, 448 U.S. at
182 n.i. Ultimately, the BPAI decided the proceeding in favor of the applicant employed by Rohm &
Haas. Id.
136 Propanil, 3,4-dichloropropionanilide, was not patented, and was, in fact, "unpatentable." Id.
at 187. The Monsanto Company was the first to attempt to obtain a patent on propanil. Id. at 181. In
1957, Monsanto filed various patent applications related to propanil. Id. In 1968, '[a]fter lengthy
proceedings" in the USPTO, a single patent issued to Monsanto. Id. However, when Monsanto sued
Rohm & Haas (the respondent in Dawson) for direct infringement, Monsanto's patent was declared
invalid. Id. at 181-82. See also Monsanto Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 312 F. Supp. 778 (E.D. Pa. 1970)
(deciding against Monsanto at the federal district court level); Monsanto Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co.,
456 F.2d 592 (3rd Cir. 1972) (affirming the Federal District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania's decision against Monsanto); and Monsanto Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 407 U.S. 934
(1972) (ending the Monsanto dispute by denying Monsanto's petition for a writ of certiorari). "The
District Court held that propanil had been implicitly revealed in prior art dating as far back as
1902, even though its use as a herbicide had been discovered only recently." Dawson, 448 U.S. at
182. "Monsanto subsequently dedicated the patent to the public ....
[which] cleared the way for
Rohm & Haas... to obtain a patent on the method of process for applying propanil." Id.
137 Id. at 183.
138 Id. at 181. This meant that if it were "applied in the proper quantities," propanil would kill
weeds in certain crops "without adversely affecting the crops themselves." Id.
139 Id.

110 The pertinent claims of the '092 patent were as follows:

1. A method for selectively inhibiting growth of undesirable plants in an area
containing growing undesirable plants in an established crop, which comprises
applying to said area 3,4-dichloropropionanilide at a rate of application which
inhibits growth of said undesirable plants and which does not adversely affect the
growth of said established crop.
2. The method according to claim 1 wherein the 3,4-dichloropropionanilide is
applied in a composition comprising 3,4- dichloropropionanilide and an inert
diluent therefor at a rate of between 0.5 and 6 pounds of 3,4dichloropropionanilide per acre.
3. The method according to claim 1 wherein most of the undesirable plants
are destroyed by 3,4-dichloropropionanilide applied thereto without substantial
adverse effect on the crop growing therewith.
6. The method according to claim 2 wherein the
monocotyledonous.

established crop

is

8. The method according to claim 2 wherein the undesirable plants include
monocotyledonous plants.
9. The method according to claim 2 wherein the undesirable plants include
dicotyledonous plants.

[3:355 2004]

Dividing the (Statutory) Baby

Prior to being sued by Rohm & Haas-indeed, before Rohm & Haas obtained the
'092 patent-Dawson also "manufactured and sold propanil for application to rice
crops." 141 The primary reason for the suit was that Dawson sold its propanil "in
containers on which [were] printed directions" for applying the chemical in
accordance with the process covered by the '092 patent. 142 Moreover, after the '092
patent issued, Dawson "did not cease manufacture and sale of propanil ... despite
knowledge that farmers purchasing [its] products would [directly] infringe on the
['092 patent] by [following the patented process to apply] the propanil to their
crops." 143 As a result, Rohm & Haas brought suit against Dawson for both
contributory infringement under § 271(c) and inducement of infringement under §
271(b). 144
As an initial response to the suit, Dawson requested that Rohm & Haas grant
licenses to practice the method covered by the '092 patent. 145 However, Rohm & Haas
refused to grant such licenses, 146 prompting Dawson to raise the defense of patent
misuse. 147 At trial, Dawson "argued that Rohm & Haas [had] misused its patent by
conveying the right to practice the patented method only to purchasers of its own
propanil. 148 The district court granted Dawson's motion for summary judgment as to
that issue. 149 Thereafter, the court of appeals reversed. 150 The Supreme Court
10. The method according to claim 2 wherein the established crop is a grain
crop.
11. The method according to claim 2 wherein the undesirable plants include
barnyardgrass [sic].
12. A method of selectively inhibiting the growth of growing, tender,
undesirable, annual plants which are susceptible to 3,4-dichloropropionanilide,
said undesirable plants growing in an area containing an established
monocotyledonous crop which is resistant to 3,4-dichloropropionanilide, which
comprises applying to said undesirable plants a composition comprising 3,4dichloropropionanilide and an inert carrier therefor at a rate of application which
inhibits growth of said undesirable plants and which does not substantially affect
the growth of said established monocotyledonous crop.
U.S. Patent No. 3,816,092 (issued June 11, 1974), available at http://patft.uspto.gov/netahtml
rchnum.htm (last visited Jan. 30, 2004). See also Rohm & Haas Co. v. Dawson Chem. Co., 191
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 691, 695 (S.D. Tex. 1976) (reciting the relevant claims of the '092 patent).
"I Dawson, 448 U.S. at 183.
12
143
M

Id.
Id.
Id. Section 271(b) provides that "[w]hoever actively induces infringement of a patent shall be

liable as an infringer." 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) (2000). Rohm & Haas' inducement of infringement claim
under § 271(b) was based on their assertion that by providing instructions to apply the chemical
according to the patented process, Dawson induced buyers of its propanil to directly infringe on the
'092 patent. Dawson, 448 U.S. at 183.
15

Id.

146- Id.

at 186. In fact, Rohm & Haas did not grant any express licenses to make or use propanil
"either to [other manufacturers,] retailers or... end users of the product." Id.
147 Id.
at 183. In addition to the patent misuse defense, Dawson also filed various counterclaims
against Rohm & Haas for "antitrust violations" stemming from Rohm & Haas' allegedly "coercive
marketing practices prior to issuance of the ['092] patent." Id. at 184 n.3. Dawson also "asserted the
invalidity of [the '092] patent on a variety of grounds." Id. at 186 n.5. Neither Dawson's
counterclaims nor its contentions as to the '092 patent's invalidity were addressed by the Supreme
Court. Id. at 184 n.3, 186 n.5.
1"8 Id. at 183.
149 Rohm & Haas Co. v. Dawson Chem. Co., 191 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 691 (S.D. Tex. 1976);
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granted Dawson's petition for a writ of certiorari1 51 to both forestall what it
considered to be "a possible conflict in the lower courts and to resolve an issue of
prime importance in the administration of the patent law. 15 2
The Supreme Court adopted the lower courts' findings and supplemented them
after accounting for some additional concessions. 153 Dawson admitted: (1) that
propanil fell under the definition of § 271(c); (2) that it knew that its propanil would
be used in an infringing manner; and, on the failure of its patent misuse defense, (3)
that it would be a contributory infringer. 154 Rohm & Haas admitted that those
customers who purchased propanil from it had an implied license to practice the '092
patent.155 The Court's primary focus, then, was on whether Rohm & Haas' actions as
to the '092 patent could qualify as "misuse," and, as a result, effectively bar Rohm &
Haas from recovery for contributory infringement under § 271(c).156 Rohm & Haas
argued that its failure to grant express licenses to practice its patented process fell
under a statutory exception to the doctrine of patent misuse as a result of the
provisions of § 271(d).157 It further argued "that if [such] conduct result[ed] in an
extension of the patent right to a control over an unpatented commodity, in [that]
158
instance the extension [had] been given express statutory sanction."
The Court began its analysis of the issue with an extensive review of how the
contributory infringement and patent misuse doctrines had developed in case law
prior to their respective codifications. 159 The Court noted that after its decision in
150 Rohm & Haas Co. v. Dawson Chem. Co., 599 F.2d 685 (5th Cir. 1979). See also Dawson, 448

U.S. at 183-85.
151 Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 444 U.S. 1012 (1980) (mem.) (granting writ of
certiorari).
152 Dawson, 448 U.S. at 185 (footnote omitted).
15: Id. at 185-87.
154 Id.
at 185-86. Thus, Dawson admitted to having committed the tort of contributory
infringement as it is defined by § 271(c). Dawson, 448 U.S. at 186.
155 Id. at 186 (citing United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241 (1942), and Adams v. Burke,
84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 453 (1873)). See also supra text accompanying note 54 (highlighting the subtle
distinction between the historical exhaustion doctrine articulated in Adams and the expanded
exhaustion doctrine articulated in Univis).
156 Dawson, 448 U.S. at 185.
517Id. at 187.
158 _Td,
159 Id. The Court first discussed the judicial development of the contributory infringement
doctrine. Id. at 188-92 (discussing Wallace v. Holmes, 29 F. Cas. 74 (C.C. Conn. 1871) (No. 17,100)
(finding that a patentee could enforce his patent rights against a party whose product facilitated its
customers' infringing acts); Morgan Envelope Co. v. Albany Paper Co., 152 U.S. 425 (1894)
(accepting the doctrine of contributory infringement, but finding it not applicable to suppliers of
perishable goods used in practicing various patents); Leeds & Catlin Co. v. Victor Talking Mach. Co.,
213 U.S. 325 (1909) (upholding an injunction against a contributory infringer who manufactured an
unpatented product, the only use for which was in a patented invention); Henry v. A.B. Dick Co.,
224 U.S. 1 (1912) (extending the contributory infringement doctrine to cover sales of all unpatented
supplies necessary to practice patented inventions); and Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal
Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917) (overruling Henry and retracting the contributory infringement
doctrine as to those merchants who sell unpatented supplies used in practicing patented
inventions)).
The Court then transitioned into a discussion of how the doctrine of patent misuse developed as
a defense to contributory infringement. Id. at 192-94 (discussing Carbice Corp. v. Am. Patents
Corp., 283 U.S. 27 (1931) (denying relief to a patentee after finding a misuse of the patent because of

[3:355 2004]

Dividing the (Statutory) Baby

B.B. Chemical Co. v. Elli, 160 it had yet to address "the status of contributory
infringement or patent misuse with respect to nonstaple goods," and that as a result,
"some courts and commentators [had] apparently [taken] the view that control of
nonstaple items capable only of infringing use might not bar patent protection
against contributory infringement."'1 61 The Court then discussed two decisions that
dealt "a serious, if not fatal, blow" to that view: Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent
Investment Co. (Mercoidj1 62 and Mercoid Corp. v. Minneapolis-HoneywellRegulator
Co. (MercoidJ).163 These cases announced the rule that "any attempt to control the

the patentee's attempt to limit the use of its patented refrigeration device only to solid carbon
dioxide made by an exclusive licensee); Leitch Mfg. Co. v. Barber Co., 302 U.S. 458 (1938) (finding
patent misuse where a patentee tried to control the sales of an unpatented staple article of
commerce used in its patented process); Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1942)
(linking the doctrine of patent misuse to the equitable doctrine of "unclean hands"); and B.B. Chem.
Co. v. Ellis, 314 U.S. 495 (1942) (holding that patent misuse barred relief even if an alleged
contributory infringer actively induced infringement)).
160314 U.S. 495 (1942).
161Dawson, 448 U.S. at 195.
162 Id. at 195-96 (discussing Mercoid , 320 U.S. 661 (1944)). The Mercoid I Court limited the
doctrine of contributory infringement by finding patent misuse after the patentee, Mid-Continent,
had attempted to control the right to make and use its patented system by conveying that right only
to those who purchased an unpatented but integral and necessary component from a licensee. 320
U.S. at 666-69.
In Mercoid I, Mid-Continent was the owner of a combination patent for a "domestic heating
system." Id. at 662. Mid-Continent exclusively licensed the rights to "to make, use, sell, and to sublicense others to make, use, and sell' its patented system to the Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator
Company (Honeywell). Id. at 663. Neither Mid-Continent nor Honeywell "manufacture [d] or
install[ed] heating systems under the . . . patent." Id. Honeywell made royalty payments to Mid
Continent based only upon the sales of a "combustion stoker switch," which was an essential but
unpatented component of the patented combination; indeed, the stoker switch was likely the "'heart
of the invention' Id. at 667. The other components of the combination included an automatic stoker
mechanism and a thermostat. Id. at 664.
Mercoid, who also made and sold stoker switches, alleged patent misuse because Honeywell
conditioned a sub-license of the right to assemble and use the patented system on the purchase of
Honeywell stoker switches. Id. The Court agreed, finding that "the limits of the patent are narrowly
and strictly confined to the terms of the grant." Id. at 665. Moreover,
[t]he necessities and convenience of the patentee do not justify any use of the
monopoly of the patent to create another monopoly. The fact that the patentee has
the power to refuse a license does not enable him to enlarge the monopoly of the
patent by the expedient of attaching conditions to its use.
Id. at 666. Thus, the Court announced, " [the result of this decision ... is to limit substantially the
doctrine of contributory infringement. What residuum may be left we need not stop to consider." Id.
at 669 (emphasis added).
163 Dawson, 448 U.S. at 195-97 (discussing Mereoid If, 320 U.S. 680 (1944)). Mercoid _I, 320
U.S. 680, presented a similar scenario to that in Mercoid I. In Mercoid II the Supreme Court
reiterated that the decision in Mercoid I explicitly abrogated protection from competition for
essential elements of a patented combination. 320 U.S. at 684.
In Mereoid IT Mercoid claimed that Honeywell, the patentee, misused its combination patent,
which "covere[d] a [tri-thermostat] system of hot air furnace control." Id. at 682. The alleged misuse
stemmed from Honeywell's grant of a non-exclusive license agreement to five of its competitors to
'make, use and sell [an unpatented] 'combination furnace control,"' which combined the functions of
two of the three thermostats necessary to practice the patented system. Id. at 682-83. Under the
agreement, Honeywell received royalties based on the licensees' sale of the combination control. Id.
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market for unpatented goods would constitute patent misuse, even if those goods had
no use outside a patented invention."164
Significantly, the Court characterized the Mercoidcases as collectively "serv[ing]
as the point of departure for congressional legislation" as to § 271.165 Yet, because
they "involved questions of control over unpatented articles that were [both] essential
to the patented inventions and ... unsuited for any commercial noninfringing use,"
the Court found both the Mercoid cases and Leeds & Catlin Co. v. Victor Talking
Machine Co.,166 a case of which Mercoid Idisapproved, 167 to "bear factual similarity"
to the dispute. 168 In Leeds & Catlin, the Court had enjoined contributory
infringement where the alleged infringer manufactured unpatented "phonograph
169
discs specially designed for use in a patented disc-and-stylus combination."
The Court then focused on the development of § 271 as "corrective legislation"
designed to rectify the post-Mercoid confusion as to questions of contributory
infringement. 170 In its analysis, the Court found that "[v]iewed against the backdrop
of judicial precedent ....
the approach that Congress took toward the codification of
contributory infringement and patent misuse reveals a compromise between those
two doctrines and their competing policies that permits patentees to exercise control

at 682-83. Moreover, Honeywell conditioned a sub-license of the right to assemble and use the
patented system on the purchase of a combination control only from one of its licensees. Id. at 683.
The parties neither sold nor installed the patented system, but Mercoid competed with
Honeywell in the supply of products equivalent to the combination control device. Id. In finding that
the patent had been misused in "plain[] violat[ion of] the anti-trust laws," the Court reiterated its
holding in Me-reoid Iand stated the rule that "[h]owever worthy it may be, however essential to the
patent, an unpatented part of a combination patent is no more entitled to monopolistic protection
than any other unpatented device." Id. at 684.
104 Dawson, 448 U.S. at 195.
105

Id.

1'6 213 U.S. 325 (1912).
107 Dawson, 448 U.S. at 197 (stating that in MercoidZ the "Court recognized that its reasoning
directly conflicted with [Leeds & Catin] ... and it registered disapproval, if not outright rejection, of
that case").
168 Id. at 198.
169 Id. at 190. In Leeds & Catlin, the patentee, Victor Talking Machine Co. (Victor), was seeking
to enforce an earlier injunction prohibiting Leeds & Catlin's manufacture of unpatented "disc
records" used in the patented combination. 213 U.S. at 329-30. Upon examining the claims, the
Court found that "[t]he disc [was] not a mere concomitant to the stylus; [but rather,] it coactled] with
the stylus to produce" sound. Id. at 335.
Leeds & Catlin urged that the dispute be resolved "under the right of repair and replacement,"
id. at 336; today, the doctrine of permissible repair. See, e.g., Aroj, 365 U.S. 336, 342-43 (1961). The
Court, however, did not agree and found that the right to repair a patented combination was limited
to "the resupply of the effective ultimate tool of the invention, which is liable to be often worn out or
to become inoperative for its intended effect . . . during the time that the machine as a whole might
last."' Leeds & Catlin,213 U.S. at 336 (quoting Wilson v. Simpson, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 109, 125 (1850)).
Thus, the Court decided that "[t]he license granted to a purchaser of a patented combination is to
preserve its fitness for use so far as it may be affected by wear or breakage. Beyond this there is no
license." Id. As a result, the Court again upheld the injunction prohibiting Leeds & Catlin from
continuing its contributorily infringing actions. Id. at 337.
170 Dawson, 448 U.S. at 199 (stating that "[the Me-reoid decisions left in their wake some
consternation among patent lawyers and a degree of confusion in the lower courts" (footnote
omitted)).
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over nonstaple articles used in their inventions."' 171 This compromise is embodied in §
271(c), which "identifies the basic dividing line between contributory infringement
and patent misuse." 172 In § 271(c), contributory infringement is defined in a
restrictive manner, distinguishing "between staple and nonstaple articles of
173
commerce" and narrowly defining what can qualify for protection as a nonstaple.
In construing § 271(c), the Court noted that "[tihe limitations on contributory
infringement written into [that section] are counterbalanced by limitations on patent
misuse in § 271(d)."174 In the Court's view,
the provisions of § 271(d) effectively confer upon the patentee, as a
lawful adjunet of his patent rights, a limited power to exclude others
from competition in nonstaple goods. A patentee may sell a nonstaple
article himself while enjoining others from marketing that same good
without his authorization. By doing so, he is able to eliminate
competitors and thereby to control the market for that product.
Moreover, his power to demand royalties from others for the privilege
of selling the nonstaple item itself implies that the patentee may
control the market for the nonstaple good; otherwise, his 'right' to sell
licenses for the marketing of the nonstaple good would be
meaningless, since no one would be willing to pay him for a
175
superfluous authorization.
Thus, the Court concluded, the "sum effect of Rohm & Haas' actions [in refusing
to grant licenses for others to sell propanil] is to suppress competition in the market
for an unpatented commodity. But as we have observed, in this its conduct is no
different from that which the statute expressly protects." 176 Moreover, in concluding
its examination of the legislative history behind § 271, the Court found that "the
Leeds & Catlin decision, which did not involve such an offer to license, was placed
before Congress as an example of the kind of contributory infringement action [§ 271]
177
would allow."
The Court then determined that "one aspect of Rohm & Haas' behavior that
[was] not expressly covered by § 271(d)," that of "its linkage of two protected
activities-sale of propanil and authorization to practice the patented processtogether in a single transaction," did not result "in any extension of control over

171

Id.at 200. The Court also noted that "the language and structure of [§ 271] lend significant

support to Rohm & Haas' contention that, because § 271(d) immunizes its conduct from the charge of

patent misuse, it should not be barred from seeking relief." Id.
172

Id.

173Id.
174 Id. at 201. The Court also noted that § 271(d) expressly excludes "[t]hree species of conduct
from characterization as [patent] misuse"; however, of the acts permitted by that section, "itdoes not
state that [the patentee] must do any of them." Id. Since Dawson, and as a result of the decision in
that case, the "species of conduct" enumerated in § 271(d) have increased in number from three to
five. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(d) (2000).
175 Dawson, 448 U.S. at 201 (emphasis added).
176Id.at 202 (emphasis added).
177 Id.at 215.
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unpatented materials beyond what § 271(d) already allow[edl."178 This was because
propanil was "a nonstaple product" whose "herbicidal property is at the heart of
[Rohm & Haas'] invention."1 7 9 Rohm & Haas' "method of doing business [was] thus
essentially the same as the method condemned in the Mereoid decisions, and the
legislative history reveal[ed] that § 271(d) was designed to retreat from Mereoid in
[that] regard."180 Thus, because propanil was "a material part of [Rohm & Haas']
invention" and qualified as a nonstaple "article . . . of commerce," the Court
determined that Rohm & Haas was free to forfend Dawson's manufacture and sale of
propanil as a result of the express provisions of §§ 271(c) and 271(d).181 Accordingly,
the Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals and found in favor of Rohm &
182
Haas.

B. Anton/Bauer." The Unpatentedbut Essential Component ofa Patented
Combination
As applied in Anton/Bauer, Inc. v PAG, Ltd.,183 the doctrine of implied license
worked a more subtle injustice than merely depriving the "true mother" of her "living
baby." For, the nature of the modern baby is such that when it is severed, it dies only
as to the patentee, its "true mother." Importantly, however, what is conferred to the
alleged infringer is neither devoid of life nor use. Rather, anyportionof the severed §
271(c) monopoly right conferred to an alleged infringer provides him with a right that
was previously within the exclusive dominion of the patentee: the right to make and
sell an unpatented but nonstaple component of a patented invention. Unfortunately
for the patentee, such a conveyance simultaneously extinguishes his § 271(c)
monopoly.
In Anton/Bauer, the CAFC relied on the doctrine of equity-implied license to
permit an alleged infringer to usurp a portion of Anton/Bauer's § 271(c) monopoly
right as to one component of its patented combination.184 Similar to that in Dawson,
the problem presented in Anton/Bauer dealt with the ramifications of selling a
product that could only be used to practice Anton/Bauer's patent.18 5 In this case,
however, unlike the propanil used in Rohm & Haas' patented process, the product
sold by Anton/Bauer was a specially designed part that constituted one half of a
186
patented combination.

178

Id.at 202. Because § 271(d) was unclear as to whether it afforded this form of protection to

patentees, the Court made its determination only after an extensive examination of the legislative

history behind §§ 271(c) and 271(d), and § 271 generally. See Dawson, 448 U.S. at 202-13
(discussing the history and development of the "Act [of 1952] to Revise and Codify the Patent
Laws"). The Court "[found] nothing in [the] legislative history to support [Dawson's] assertion that
[Rohm & Haas'] behavior [fell] outside the scope of § 271(d)." Id. at 213.
179

Id. at 214.

180 Id.
181
1d. at 213-14.
182

Id. at 223.

183329 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2003), reh'gandreh'genbane denied.
184

See id. at 1350-53.

185 Id. at 1351; Dawson, 448 U.S. at 185-86.
186

Dawson, 448 U.S. at 181-82; Anton/Baue, 329 F.3d at 1346-47.
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The primary issue in Anton/Bauer was whether Anton/Bauer's own customers
had an implied license to practice Anton/Bauer's patented invention if the patent was
for a mated combination of two parts, and Anton/Bauer sold one half of the pair
separate from the other, without restriction.18 7 Anton/Bauer was the owner of U.S.
Patent No. 4,810,204 (the '204 patent), which covered a combination of two parts, a
male and a female "plate."188 Anton/Bauer brought suit against PAG as a result of
PAG's manufacture and sale of a product containing the male plate.18 9 In its
complaint, Anton/Bauer alleged that PAG was liable for inducement of infringement
and contributory infringement in violation of §§ 271(b) and 271(c), respectively. 190
Anton/Bauer "manufacture[d] and [sold] a wide variety of batteries and chargers
used in video production . . . devices, such as professional video cameras." 191 The

combination claimed in the '204 patent facilitated a keyed mechanical and electrical
connection between a battery unit, containing the male plate, and either a battery
charger or video camera containing the female plate. 192 Moreover, the female plate
included a "releasable locking" mechanism to facilitate the rapid connection and
release of the two plates. 193 Neither plate was individually claimed in the '204
187

Anton/Baue±r 329 F.3d at 1347.

188 Id. at 1345-46. The pertinent claim of the '204 patent was as follows:

1. A releasable connection for a battery pack or the like comprising a
relatively flat male plate and a relatively flat female plate, said plates being
adapted to be releasably locked together in connected position; said female plate
including a plurality of keyholes with each having an opening and a depending
slot, and at least one elongated terminal, said terminal and keyhole slots being
elongate in the same direction; said male plate including a plurality of spaced
headed projections with there being one for each keyhole and with each projection
having head and leg portions, and at least one elongated mating terminal; said
male plate being positioned abutting the female plate with the leg portions of the
projections being located in the slots of the associated keyholes and with the one
terminal within the mating terminal; releasable locking means on said female
plate for engaging at least one of the headed projections in at least one of said
keyhole slots to lock said plates in connected position by preventing relative
movement between said plates in the direction of said keyhole slots by
maintaining the engagement of said locking means with said headed projection
until said locking means is released; and safety latch means on said female plate
for preventing movement of said releasable locking means upon engagement of
said locking means with said headed projection.
U.S. Patent No. 4,810,204 (issued Mar. 7, 1989), available at http://patft.uspto.gov/netahtml
rchnum.htm (last visited Jan. 30, 2004). See also Anton/Bauer, 329 F.3d at 1346 (reciting the
relevant claims of the '204 patent).
189 Anton/Bauer, 329 F.3d at 1345.
190 Id.
191Id. at 1346. See also http://www.antonbauer.com (last visited Feb. 18, 2004) (describing
many of Anton/Bauer's battery products).
192 Anton/Bauer, 329 F.3d at 1346. In the context of Anton/Bauer's plates, it is appropriate to
define "key" as "a pin . . . wedge, or other piece inserted in a space to lock or hold parts of a
mechanism or structure together." RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER'S COLLEGE DICTIONARY 742 (1992)
[hereinafter RANDOM HOUSE]. Thus, the various projections on the male plate collectively
constituted the "pin ....
wedge, or other piece[s]." Id. When those projections were inserted into the
corresponding spaces-the "keyholes or slots," Anton/Bauer, 329 F.3d at 1346-on the female plate,
then the male and female plates would be held together as a single "mechanism or structure,"
RANDOM HOUSE, supra.
193 Anton/Bauer, 329 F.3d at 1346.

[3:355 2004]

John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law

patent. 194 "Anton/Bauer manufacture[d] and [sold] both female plates and battery
packs containing male plates"; however, it sold its female plates directly to video
equipment manufactures who integrated those plates into their devices, which were
then sold to the public. 195 Anton/Bauer sold its female plates without "any
restrictions" as to how they might be used. 196 Moreover, devices containing the male
and female plates were usually not sold together. 197 PAG also manufactured and sold
its own battery pack that could "be used in combination with [devices containing]
Anton/Bauer's female plate[]."198 PAG's battery pack could be so used because it, too,
contained a male plate as claimed in the '204 patent. 199
In assessing Anton/Bauer's motion for a preliminary injunction against PAG, the
district court examined and rejected each of PAG's four defenses. 200 First, the court
concluded that the doctrine of permissible repair did not give PAG the right to
manufacture and sell a device containing the male plate because "the nature and
design of the '204 patented combination indicate[d] that replacing a 'female' or 'male
plate' . . . [would] amounti to reconstruction of that combination." 20 1 Second, the
court found that the doctrine of implied license did not apply to allow purchasers of a
device containing a female plate to complete the patented combination with one of
PAG's devices containing a male plate. 20 2 Third, the court concluded that PAG's

19

Id. at 1347.

195 Id.
196; _Td

197 Id.
198

Id. See also http://www.pagusa.com (last visited Feb. 18, 2004) (describing many of PAG's

battery products).
199 Anton/Bauer, 329 F.3d at 1347.
200 Anton/Bauer, Inc. v. PAG, Ltd., No. Civ.A. 3:01CV577 (CFD), 2002 WL 1359673, at *4 (D.
Conn. June 13, 2002).
201 Id. at *5. The district court stated that
the particular way the male and female plates combine is the invention. Unlike . .
• the convertible top in Amo, the '204 patented combination is more than the sum
total of separate, replaceable parts. It is a mechanical and electrical connection-a
locking mechanism containing elements that permit quick and easy separation
and rejoining ....
The particular locking mechanism is the invention. While PAG
characterizes the '204 patented combination as a device composed of a battery
pack and a camera mount, the '204 patent discloses a broader combination. The
invention is the interconnection between 'male' and 'female' plates, regardless of
whether a battery is attached to the 'male plate' or a camera is attached to the
'female plate.'
Id. at *6 (emphasis added). The court also concluded that "even [if it were to assume that] the '204
patented combination ... [had] the capability of becoming 'spent,' . . . the parts of the '204 patented
combination [would] not become spent before the unit as a whole." Id. at *7.
202 Id. at *7-8. The court's findings on this issue were based on the fact that PAG's "battery
pack [was] not a 'replacement' for any component of the mechanical and electrical connection
disclosed in the '204 patented combination." Id. at *8. Moreover, although
Anton/Bauer [did] not expressly restrict the use of its products containing a
'female plate' with otherwise unauthorized parts, the evidence does not suggest
that Anton/Bauer's actions regarding the sale of 'female plates' [led] the end-user
to believe it may purchase or use additional non-Anton/Bauer components in
order to make the 'female plates' functional.
Id. (citation omitted). See supra text accompanying note 34 (discussing a possible reason for which
the district court might have misapplied the CAFC's implied license analysis in Bandag).
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battery pack was not a staple article of commerce such that § 271(c) would not
apply. 20 3 Finally, in determining that "Anton/Bauer [was] likely to succeed on the
merits of its claims," the court found that PAG had "the requisite knowledge or intent
for contributory or induced infringement." 20 4 Thus, the district court granted
20 5
Anton/Bauer's motion for a preliminary injunction.
PAG, of course, appealed the district court's ruling to the CAFC. 206 On appeal,
PAG did not "dispute[] that [its] battery pack, when placed in combination with
Anton/Bauer's female plate, [directly infringed] the claims of the '204 patent." 20 7 The
court stated that "[in order [for Anton/Bauer] to succeed on its claims of inducement
of infringement and contributory infringement, Anton/Bauer must prove that its own
customers directly infringe the '204 patent when they use PAG's . . . battery pack in
combination with [Anton/Bauer's] female plate."20 8 PAG argued that Anton/Bauer's

customers could "not directly infringe the '204 patent because they [were] protected
20
by the exhaustion doctrine and by an implied license."

9

Citing Univis, which articulated the expanded exhaustion doctrine, the court
first analyzed PAG's exhaustion doctrine defense, stating "[the] sale of an unpatented
article exhausts the seller's right to control the future sale and use of that article, but
only certain circumstances exhaust the seller's patent right and result in an implied
20:3AntonlBauor, 2002 WL 1359673, at *8. In its staple-nonstaple analysis, the court found
insignificant the fact that PAG's battery pack could also be used noninfringingly in conjunction with
the female plates claimed in one of Anton/Bauer's expired patents. Id.
204 Id. at *9. The court's finding was based on "evidence that (1) PAG knew of the '204 patent,
(2) end-users of [PAG's] battery pack [were] urged by PAG to use [it] with Anton/Bauer mounts, and
(3) very few, if any, 'female plates' disclosed in [one of Anton/Bauer's expired patents] exist[ed] in
the marketplace." Id.
205 Id. at *10. In deciding in Anton/Bauer's favor, the court also found that Anton/Bauer would
endure "irreparable harm" without an injunction, and that there was no "public interest" that
should prevail over the grant of an injunction. Id.
206 See AntonlBauer, 329 F.3d 1343. It must be noted that the CAFC's decision to grant
Anton/Bauer's motion for a preliminary injunction was not directed to the merits of Anton/Bauer's
contributory and inducement of infringement claims, but primarily as to the "likelihood of
[Anton/Bauer's] success on the merits" of those claims. Id. at 1348-53 (emphasis added). The
Supreme Court has stated that
[t]he purpose of a preliminary injunction is merely to preserve the relative
positions of the parties until a trial on the merits can be held .... [Moreover,] the
findings of fact and conclusions of law made by a court granting a preliminary
injunction are not binding at trial on the merits.
Univ. of Tex. v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 395 (1981). However, it seems likely that the nature of
such a decision, if based on a sufficiently in-depth analysis of the evidence, could foreshadow
difficulty for Anton/Bauer in succeeding on the merits of its claims at trial. Soo JOHN F. DOBBYN,
INJUNCTIONS IN A NUTSHELL 179 (1974) (stating that "generally evidence offered [in the course of
injunction proceedings] may be considered as evidence going to the merits of the case for purposes of
the final decision"). But e Bursten v. Phillips, 351 F.2d 616 (9th Cir. 1965) (stating that "the
findings made on motion for preliminary injunction, even though they relate, in whole or in part, to
issues
going to the merits of the case, are not determinative of those issues at trial").
20
7 Anton/Bauer, 329 F.3d at 1347.
208 Id. at 1349.
209 Id. On appeal, the court did not address the doctrine of permissible repair "[i]n light of [its]
disposition of [the] case and in light of the fact that the parties both [took] the position that [it did]
not apply [to the] case." Id. n.2. See also supra text accompanying note 34 (offering a possible
explanation as to why both parties, as opposed to just PAG, might have taken such a position).
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license." 210 The court read Univis to "suggest that an implied license stems from the

exhaustion of a patent right."211 Thus, when Anton/Bauer sold its "unpatented female
212
plate," the sale constituted "a complete transfer of the ownership of the plate."

Moreover, "the sale extinguishe[d] Anton/Bauer's right to control the use of the plate,
because the plate [could] only be used in the patented combination, and the
2 13
combination must be completed by the purchaser."
The court then addressed PAG's implied license contention. 214 Relying on the
two-part equity-implied license analysis that it developed in Bandag,the court found
that both elements were satisfied as to Anton/Bauer's female plate. 215 First, the
parties agreed that there were no noninfringing uses for Anton/Bauer's female
plate.2 16 The court concluded that "Anton/Bauer place[d] on the market one
component of a patented combination that [had] no other use than to complete the
patentded] combination with a second unpatented component."2 17 Second, the court
found that "sales of the female plate [were] authorized sales to Anton/Bauer['s]
customers" and that Anton/Bauer did not "place[] express restrictions on the use of
the female plates it sold," either as to manufacturers who integrated the plate into
their products or the consumers who purchased those products.218 As a result of its
findings, the court concluded that by selling its female plate alone, Anton/Bauer's
customers were granted an "implied license to practice the patented combination
during the life of the female plate."219 Therefore, because "there [was] no direct
infringement," there was no "support [for] a claim of either inducement of
220
infringement or contributory infringement."
The court then addressed several of Anton/Bauer's ultimately unpersuasive
arguments. 221 First, the court stated that "when a female plate is purchased from
Anton/Bauer, the purchaser receives an implied license to practice the claimed
invention

.

.

. regardless of when [or from which party]

a male plate [was]

acquired."2 22 However, the court noted that "no license is granted to use the patented
combination upon purchase of [PAG's] battery pack and no infringement by PAG
occurs due to the sale."2 2

3

Second, the court stated that "Anton/Bauer could have, if

novel," patented its plates individually, or it could have sold the plates "together as

210

Anton/Bauer, 329 F.3d at 1349-50.

211

Id.

212

Id. at 1351.

213

Id.

Id.
Id. at 1350, 1351. Citing Met-Coil Systems Coip. v. Korners Unlimited Inc., 803 F.2d 684,
686 (Fed. Cir. 1986), the first CAFC case to rely on the Bandagequity-implied license analysis, the
2H

215

court stated that "[a] patentee grants an implied license to a purchaser when (1) the patentee sells

an article that has no noninfringing uses and (2) the circumstances of the sale plainly indicate that
the grant of a license should be inferred." Anton/Bauer,329 F.3d at 1350.
216 Id. at 1351.
217Id.
218 Id.
219 Id. at 1351, 1352.
220 Id.
221 Id. at 1351-53.
222 Id. at 1352.
223

Id.
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the patented combination." 224 Finally, the court stated that its decision did not
"obviate the applicability of the contributory infringement doctrine in every case.
Rather, it merely limit[ed] a patentee's ability to assert contributory infringement
where the patentee has chosen to sell part, but not all, of its patented
combination." 225 As a result of finding that Anton/Bauer would likely fail on the
merits of its claims, the court concluded that it need not factor "irreparable harm" or
"public interest" considerations into its decision to reverse the district court and
22
repeal Anton/Bauer's preliminary injunction against PAG. 6

C. Ignoringthe Teachings in Dawson, Anton/Bauer Divided the Baby
This section will compare the Supreme Court's articulation of the § 271(c)
monopoly right in Dawson to the CAFC's finding in Anton/Bauer. It will be argued
that the CAFC's implied license analysis effectively denied Anton/Bauer's § 271(c)
monopoly right as to its unpatented male plate.

1. A ThresholdMatter: Whether a PatentMisuse Defense is Raised is Immaterial to
a § 271( Analysis
In Dawson, the Supreme Court's primary focus was on whether Rohm & Haas
misused its patent. 227 In Anton/Bauer, PAG did not raise the defense of patent
misuse. 228 However, the fact that PAG did not raise such a defense should not have
precluded from the Anton/Bauer decision the application of the § 271 analysis
developed by Supreme Court in Dawson. Rather, regardless of the defenses that PAG
presented, the CAFC should have embarked on the analysis necessary to recognize
Anton/Bauer's § 271(c) monopoly right as to both the male and female plate
components of its patented combination.
Sections 271(c) and 271(d) do not always stand alone in their statutory
operation. 229 "The limitations on contributory infringement written into § 271(c) are
counterbalancedby limitations on patent misuse in § 271(d)."230 Yet, even where no
defense of patent misuse is claimed, the provisions of § 271(c) still operate
independently to confer the right to control unpatented articles that fall under the
rubric of that section. Indeed, the counterbalancing provisions of § 271(d) only
become significant when the defense of patent misuse is raised; § 271(d) simply lists
23 1
those activities that do not qualify as misuse.
221 Id. at
225 Id. at
226 Id.

1352-53.
1353.

227 Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 187 (1980). Dawson claimed that
Rohm & Haas misused its patent either by (1) refusing to grant a license to Dawson, or by (2)
linking the use of its patented process to the purchase of only that propanil which Rohm & Haas had
manufactured. Id.
22
8 SeeAnton/Bauer, 329 F.3d 1343.
22) See Dawson, 448 U.S. at 201.
230

Id. (emphasis added).

231

Id.
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Regardless of the defenses that PAG put forth, the Anton/Bauer decision simply
failed to address strong indications that both components in Anton/Bauer's patented
combination individually fell under the protection of § 271(c). Rather than addressing
that issue, the CAFC found that PAG was saved from contributory infringement
liability by the doctrine of implied license. 232 But, the absence of any § 271(c) analysis
as to the components of Anton/Bauer's patented combination suggests that the
doctrine of implied license was applied blindly.2 33 If an implied license is to be found
at all, whether a § 271 monopoly right exists must be determined as a necessary link
in the analytical chain. Without such a determination, the doctrine of implied license
simply destroys the § 271 monopoly right, the very same right that should have
precluded the doctrine from affecting the outcome of Anton/Bauer.

2. The Bandag Equity-ImpliedLicense Analysis Fails to Account for the § 271(c)
Monopoly Right
In Dawson, the Supreme Court relied on the Univis exhaustion-implied license
analysis to find that Rohm & Haas' customers had an implied license to use Rohm &
Haas' propanil to practice its patented process.23 4 Yet, because propanil was the sole
component of the patented process, the conferral of an implied license to its
customers did not sever Rohm & Haas' § 271(c) monopoly right as to the propanil:
Rohm & Haas received full remuneration for its propanil upon selling it. In addition,
because it was the only component of the patented process, payment for the propanil
also served as payment for a license, albeit an implied license, to use the patented
process. Thus, because of propanil's unique status as the only element necessary to
Anton/Bauer, 329 F.3d at 1350-53.
It could be argued that the court in Anton/Bauer assumed the applicability of § 27 1(c) to the
female plate but dispensed with a § 271(c) analysis as to that component after finding that upon
making authorized sales of its female plates, Anton/Bauer parted with its § 271(c) monopoly right
under the terms of the expanded exhaustion doctrine. -d. at 1349-51. However, no such exhaustion
can be said to have occurred as to the male plate. See id.As a result, a § 271(c) analysis should have
been performed as to that component. Yet, because it lacked such an analysis, the court's finding of
an implied license to practice the patented combination unceremoniously (or "blindly") severed
Anton/Bauer's almost certain § 271(c) monopoly right as to its male plate and handed the remnants
to PAG.
234 Dawson, 448 U.S. at 186. "The parties agree ... that farmers who buy propanil from Rohm &
Haas may use it, without fear of being sued for direct infringement, by virtue of an 'implied license'
they obtain when Rohm & Haas relinquishes its monopoly by selling the propanil." Id. Although the
parties stipulated to that effect, the Court cited Univis, United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S.
241 (1942), as standing for that proposition, Dawson, 448 U.S. at 186. See also Met-Coil Sys. Corp. v.
Korners Unlimited, Inc. 628 F. Supp. 130, 133 (W.D. Pa. 1986) (finding that Univis "dealt with [an]
implied license to complete an uncompleted article"). But see LG Elecs., Inc. v. Asustek Computer,
Inc., 65 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1589, 1597-98 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (rejecting the plaintiffs contention "that
Univis must be analyzed as an implied license case").
In Dawson, the Court's reliance on the Univis standard perhaps resulted from the fact that the
number of elements required to practice the patented methods in those cases was identical. Dawson,
448 U.S. at 181-82, 186; Univis, 316 U.S. at 248-49. Similar to Univis' patented finishing process,
which required only a single component (an unpatented lens blank), Univis, 316 U.S. at 248-49,
only a single component was required to practice Rohm & Haas' patented method of exterminating
weeds (an unpatented chemical, propanil), Dawson, 448 U.S. at 181-82.
232
233
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practice the patented process, whenever propanil was sold, Rohm & Haas was
compensated for its entire patent monopoly.
However, in Anton/Bauer, although the CAFC cited Univis for the contention
that Anton/Bauer exhausted its rights to control its female plate upon selling that
236
device, 235 the case was decided with the CAFC's equity-implied license analysis.
The origins of that analysis can be traced to Bandag, where the CAFC decided that
237
an alleged infringer did not have an implied license to practice a patented process.
Unlike the Univis analysis as applied to those patented processes that may be fully
practiced using only a single key element, the Bandag analysis, when applied to
patented combinations, fails to account for the possibility that each component of the
scrutinized combination is subject to a § 271(c) monopoly right on an individual
238
basis.
First, the Bandag analysis mandates that the component at issue must not have
any "noninfringing uses." 239 But, by definition, if a component falls under the
protection of § 271(c), and is thus subject to a § 271(c) monopoly right, that
component will never have any noninfringing uses. 240 The fact that a component has
no noninfringing uses, however, does not guarantee the protection provided by §
271(c); rather, such a determination serves to satisfy only one of several conditions
that will make a component subject to a § 271(c) monopoly right.2 41 Second, the
Bandag analysis mandates that the circumstances of the sale should give rise to an
inference that a license should be granted.2 42 In Anton/Bauer, the court found such
circumstances because Anton/Bauer failed to place express restrictions on its female
plates when sold.2 43 However, like the propanil in Dawson, which had no other use
but in practicing Rohm & Haas' patented process, 24 4 it was not unreasonable for
235

AntonlBauer, 329 F.3d at 1351. The court stated that Anton/Bauer's "sale of the unpatented

female plate ...[was] a complete transfer of ownership of the plate. In effect, the sale extinguishe[d]
Anton/Bauer's right to control the use of the plate, because the plate [could] only be used in the
patented combination and the combination must be completed by the purchaser." Id. Essentially, the
court followed the holding in Univis on that issue. See Anton/Bauer, 329 F.3d at 1351.
236 Anton/Bauer, 329 F.3d at 1350-51. "A patentee grants an implied license to a purchaser
when (1) the patentee sells an article that has no noninfringing uses and (2) the circumstances of
the sale plainly indicate that the grant of a license should be inferred." Id. at 350.
237Bandag, Inc. v. Al Bolser's Tire Stores, Inc., 750 F.2d 903, 924-25 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
The evidence provided by [the alleged infringer] to meet [the] burden [of establishing an
implied license] fails in at least two respects. First, no license can be implied, where, as
here, the equipment involved has other noninfringing uses, even if only as replacement
parts .... [Second, a] mere sale does not import a license except where the circumstances
plainly indicate that the grant of a license should be inferred.

Id.
2:38However, potential counter-arguments exist. See supra text accompanying note 233.
2:39Bandag, 750 F.2d at 924.
240

See 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (2000) (providing protection for those unpatented components of

patented combinations that are, among other qualifications, "not . . . suitable for substantial
noninfringing use").
241

See id.

242

Bandag,750 F.2d at 925.

24:13
Anton/Bauer, Inc. v. PAG, Ltd., 329 F.3d 1343, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2003). "[T]here is no evidence

that Anton/Bauer places express restrictions on the use of the female plates it sells or that it
requires that manufacturers to whom it sells female plates expressly restrict the grant of a license
upon sale of the finished camera product that incorporates the plate." Id.
244 Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 185-86 (1980).
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Anton/Bauer to eschew such restrictions for the simple reason that both of its plates
24 5
likely fell under the protection of § 271(c).
Accordingly, the problem created by the Bandag analysis is that it fails to
account for the fact that each unpatented element of a patented combination might
be protected by § 271(c).246 Certainly, not all elements of patented combinations
qualify for such protection. 247 However, as in Anton/Bauer, where each plate clearly
fell under the rubric of § 271(c), there is no reason for the patentee to place express
restrictions on the sale of such components because the § 271(c) monopoly right
248
protects the patentee from competition as to both components.
Like the Univis exhaustion-implied license analysis applied to propanil, the only
circumstances under which a license should be implied to complete a patented
combination are when each of those components falling under the protection of §
271(c) are purchased from the patentee. This standard insures that patentees in a
similar position to Anton/Bauer-where different components of a patented invention
necessarily must be sold to different customers at different points in the chain of
commerce in order to make commercial distribution of the invention economically
viable-are permitted to reap the benefits of their patent regardless of any productspecific limitations that may encumber its commercialization. Yet, it seems that the
Anton/Bauer decision ignored any such standard and, in so doing, the CAFC
penalized Anton/Bauer precisely because of such a product-specific limitation. The
nature of Anton/Bauer's invention, in conjunction with Anton/Bauer's decision to sell
its male and female plates separately, led the CAFC to apply the Bandag equityimplied license analysis such that the holding was contrary to that which would have
been garnered if the court had applied the Univis exhaustion-implied license analysis
in Dawson. The CAFC's rigid application of the Bandag equity-implied license
analysis under the factual circumstances of Anton/Ba uer simply ignored the § 271(c)
monopoly right that Anton/Bauer was entitled to. Consequently, the CAFC's decision
did nothing less than divide the baby.

Anton/Bauer, 329 F.3d at 1347 (finding that "Anton/Bauer's female plates are designed
exclusively for use in the '204 patent, and [that] it [was] undisputed that their use in that
combination [was] also their sole use"). Also, in its equity-implied license analysis, the CAFC
determined that "AntonBauer place[d] on the market one component of a patented combination that
[had] no other use than to complete the patent combination with a second unpatented component."
Id. at 1351. Thus, because of the "keyed" design of the parts, it seems clear that neither
245,

component-not just the female-had any use but as one half of the patented combination. See
Anton/Bauer, 329 F.3d at 1351.
216 See 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (2000).
247

See id.

A counter argument to this assertion is that there may be legitimate instances where
principles of equity apply such that a patentee is estopped from asserting a § 271(c) monopoly right
as to certain unpatented components of his patented combination. However, in the absence of any
other factors to indicate that estoppel should apply, it seems highly unreasonable that a mere failure
to place restrictions on the sale of an otherwise statutorilyproteetedcomponent alone could indicate
the requisite circumstances under which the patentee implicitly assents to parting with his § 271(c)
monopoly right as to that component.
218
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IV. PROPOSAL
The first part of this section will discuss a possible solution to the problem
created by the Bandag equity-implied license analysis as applied in Anton/Ba uer: the
addition of an intermediate step to account for the § 271(c) monopoly right. The
proposed solution is a general solution. As such, it would apply to all scenarios
involving patented combinations of unpatented components where one or more of
those components fall under the protection of § 271(c). The second part of this section
will conclude with a brief discussion concerning how the doctrine of permissible
repair might have factored into the Anton/Bauer decision in light of the analysis put
forth in the first section.

A. A § 271(e)Analysis as an IntermediateStep in the Bandag Equity-ImpliedLicense
Analysis
The Bandag equity-implied license analysis would more properly account for a
patentee's § 271(c) monopoly right through the introduction of a § 271(c) analysis as
an intermediate step. 249 This new implied license analysis-the § 271(c)-implied
license analysis-would apply in those situations where an alleged contributory
infringer claimed that it was protected from contributory infringement liability as a
result of an implied license; specifically, an implied license granted to the patentee's
customers. 250 Moreover, the proposed § 271(c)-implied license analysis would apply
only to patented combinations where one or more of the unpatented constituents
might qualify for § 271(c) protection. Finally, the unique aspect of the proposed §
271(c)-implied license test is that unless each unpatented component of a patented
combination is subjected to the analysis, the test may fail to take into account the §
271(c) monopoly right and thus will yield the same result as the original Bandagtest.
This modification shifts the Bandag test from an invention-level analysis to a

249 The Bandag equity-implied license analysis was developed in a direct infringement case,

which may explain why the § 271(c) monopoly right was left wholly absent from its analysis.
Bandag, Inc. v. Al Bolser's Tire Stores, Inc., 750 F.2d 903, 921-22 (Fed. Cir. 1984). As developed in
Bandag, the equity-implied license analysis was used to ascertain whether the purchaser of
components necessary to practice a patented method acquired a license as a function of the sale. Id.
at 924-26. The CAFC determined that the expanded exhaustion doctrine developed in Univis did
not apply to the facts of that case because the patent covered "a method of retreading [tires]" and

therefore could not "read on the equipment" that the alleged infringer had used to practice the
patented method. Id. at 924. Yet, in combination as an apparatus, the equipment that the alleged
infringer had purchased could only be used to practice the patented method. Id. at 923-24. As a
result, because the various pieces of equipment were not claimed together as a combination for
practicing the patented method, the individual components of the apparatus would not have been
subject to a § 271(c) monopoly right. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (2000). However, the apparatus as a
whole would have been subject to such a right. See id. (providing protection against contributory
infringement as to any "material or apparatus for use in practicing a patented process").
250 Anton/Bauer, 329 F.3d at 1349. "'Absent direct infringement of the claims of a patent, there
can be neither contributory infringement nor inducement of infringement."' (quoting Carborundum
Co. v. Molten Metal Equip. Innovations, Inc., 72 F.3d 872, 876 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 1995)).
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component-level analysis. 251 As such, the proposed analysis only grants an implied
license to practice a patented combination where an implied license (here, a partial
implied license) is found as to each part of the combination that individually is
protected under § 271(c).
In order to effectively account for the § 271(c) monopoly right as to each
component of a patented combination, a § 271(c) analysis should be introduced
between the first and second stages of the Bandag equity-implied license analysis.
Currently, the first requirement of the Bandag analysis is that the component for
252
which an implied license is sought must have "no noninfringing uses."
Conveniently, this requirement is nearly identical to one of the elements necessary
for a component to qualify for § 271(c) protection. 253 However, in order to achieve
total identity, this element of the Bandaganalysis should be changed to an inquiry of
whether the component to be analyzed has "substantialnoninfringing uses." 254 Thus,
this aspect of the Bandag analysis would undergo only a slight change. 255 If the
inquiry could be answered in the affirmative, then, similar to the Bandag analysis,
no implied license could be granted. 256 However, if the inquiry could be answered in
the negative, the analysis would proceed to the proposed intermediate stage where
2 57
the existence velnon of a § 271(c) monopoly right would be determined.
The proposed intermediate stage of the analysis inquires as to whether the
unpatented component being scrutinized is subject to the protection of § 271(c). If the
§ 271(c)-implied license analysis has proceeded to this second analytical stage, then
the first condition necessary for § 271(c) protection has been satisfied: the component
is "not ... suitable for substantial noninfringing use." 258 Thus, the inquiry turns to
whether the scrutinized component satisfies the remaining conditions for § 271(c)
protection. First, because the § 271(c)-implied license analysis is suitable only for use
with patented combinations, one condition of § 271(c) is automatically satisfied:
Section 271(c) specifically provides protection for unpatented components of patented
combinations. 259 Second, the scrutinized component must be a "material part of the
[patented combination."260 Third, the scrutinized component must "be especially
made or especially adapted for use in an infringement of [the patented
251 See, e.g., Anton/Bauer, 329 F.3d at 1350-51 (applying the Bandag equity-implied license
analysis to determine not whether an alleged infringer had a right to make and sell an unpatented
component of a patented combination, but whether third parties had a right to freely practice the
patented combination as whole).
252 Id. at 1350.
253 See 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (2000).
254 See 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (2000) (emphasis added).
255 Bandag, Inc. v. Al Bolser's Tire Stores, Inc., 750 F.2d 903, 924 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
256

In Bandag, the court found that the equipment sold to the alleged infringer did have several

nonifninging uses. Id. at 924-25. The court stated that [a]t the very minimum, to avoid infringing
the [patented method, the alleged infringer] could have resold the equipment it obtained from [one
of the patentee's then terminated franchises] or on a piecemeal basis.... The possibility also existed
to modify some of the equipment." Id. However, the court did not expound upon the financial
propriety of any of its suggestions for avoiding infringement. Id. at 924.
257 The Latin phrase ve] non is an expression meaning "or not" or "[o]r the absence of it."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1552 (7th ed. 1999).
258

35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (2000).

259 Id.
20

Id.
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combination].261 Finally, the scrutinized component cannot be "a staple article or
commodity of commerce."262

If any one of the conditions for § 271(c) protection are not satisfied, then the
scrutinized component is, of course, not protected by § 271(c), and the analysis
proceeds as it otherwise would under Bandag. Specifically, the inquiry will turn to
address whether the circumstances of the component's sale give rise to an indication
that a license should be inferred. 263 If, at the conclusion of the analysis, a court
determines that a given component of a patented combination is subject to an implied
264
license, then that license should be characterized as partial.
As such, only if a
partial implied license is found as to each and every component of a patented
265
combination can an implied license be found as to the combination as a whole.

However, determining that an implied license should be inferred as to a given
component after it has been found not subject to § 271(c) protection is not the only
path leading to a partial implied license. Even if a]] of the conditions necessary for §
271(c) protection are satisfied, then the inquiry will proceed in the same manner as it
would if one or more of those conditions were unsatisfied-with one crucial exception.
At this point in the analysis, it will have been determined that the scrutinized
component falls under the protection of § 271(c). Therefore, in order to account for the
patentee's § 271(c) monopoly right as to that component, the second Bandag factor
must be modified. Accordingly, the circumstances surrounding the sale of a
component protected by § 271(c) will not provide a plain indication that a license

261 Id.

Bandag, Inc. v. Al Bolser's Tire Stores, Inc., 750 F.2d 903, 925 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
264 This stage in the analysis will capture any component of a patented combination that does
not merit § 271(c) protection. These components will likely fall into two categories. The first category
is comprised of common (i.e., unpatentable) unpatented components, such as many threaded
fasteners, springs or other ubiquitous mechanical parts. The second category is comprised of any
patented components that may be subelements of a patented combination.
Since the first category contains components that are unpatentable, and which, therefore, likely
could not qualify for § 271(c) protection, it is unlikely that any set of circumstances surrounding
their sale will prevent a finding of a partial implied license as to those components. In contrast,
because those components in the second category are patented, and therefore subject to protection
from direct infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(a), the surrounding circumstances analysis will
necessarily be more involved. Realistically, however, the protection afforded by § 271(a) likely will
preclude a court from finding that a partial implied license should be granted as to any patented
component of a patented combination. See Anton/Bauer, Inc. v. PAG, Ltd., 329 F.3d 1343, 1352-53
(Fed. Cir. 2003) (stating that if one of the two unpatented components had been patented, protection
for the appellee's patented combination would have been improved).
265 While determining whether "each and every component of a patented combination" is subject
to a partial implied license might sound like a tall order, such an inquiry likely will be necessary
only as to certain "crucial" components of patented combinations. Such components might include,
for example, the male and female plates in Anton/Bauer, 329 F.3d at 1346-47, or patented
subelements of patented combinations. In contrast, because common (i.e., unpatentable) unpatented
components almost always would be subject to a partial implied license, see supra text
accompanying note 264, the need to evaluate the § 271(c) status of each of those parts is largely
obviated. This assumes, however, that the parties will agree that such items are truly "common"
components.
2 3
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should be inferred unless that component was purchased from the patentee or one of
266
his chosen successors in interest: a grantee, express licensee, or another customer.
Thus, if the scrutinized component is protected by § 271(c) and was purchased
from the patentee or a party who has given some consideration for some amount of
control over that component, this inquiry will yield a partial implied license as to
that component. Importantly, the "partial" nature of the implied license is merely to
facilitate a temporary analytical construction. As such, the partiality of the license
will dissolve upon subjecting each component of the patented combination to the
proposed test. If the circumstances surrounding the sale of each and every component
are found to be appropriate in light of each component's § 271(c) status, as
determined in the proposed intermediate stage of the analysis, then the partial
implied license as to each element will merge into a "full" implied license to practice
267
the patented combination.

B. Anton/Bauer and the Doctrine of PermissibleRepair
Had the proposed §271(c)-implied license analysis been applied to Rohm & Haas'
unpatented propanil in Dawson, the result of that case would have remained the
same. 268 However, had the proposed analysis been utilized in Anton/Bauer, those
266 Anton/Bauer, 329 F.3d at 1352. Soo Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176,
201 (1980). One or more of the latter three terms could be used to characterize a video camera
manufacturer who integrated into its products Anton/Bauer's female plate. Anton/Bauer, 329 F.3d
at 1352. Only the final term would apply to consumers who purchased those camera products. Id.
While Anton/Bauer may not expressly choose those consumers, presumably, Anton/Bauer would
have chosen to deal with the manufacturer of the products purchased. As a result, those consumers,
too, could be considered Anton/Bauer's successors in interest. Id. "If the original purchaser [of the
female plate] is a manufacturer, then [any] implied license [that might be found as to that
component] is passed on to the customer when the customer buys the camera with female plate from
the manufacturer." Id. The proposed analysis comports with that in Dawson because the purpose of
§ 271(c) is to provide the patentee with what amounts to a monopoly as to any unpatented
component of his patented combination that falls within the statutory rubric. See Dawson, 448 U.S.
at 201.
267 While it might be argued that the goal of the proposed analysis is simply to provide a method
of proving the pre-determined conclusion that Anton/Bauer was decided incorrectly, such an
argument would underestimate the magnitude of the CAFC's subtle doctrinal shift in Anton/Bauer.
The goal of this comment's proposal is to highlight the necessity of modifying the CAFC's equityimplied license analysis to account for the § 271(c) monopoly right. This right plainly exists on the
face of 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) and was reinforced by the Supreme Court's findings in Dawson. However,
as applied in AntonlBauer, the CAFC's equity-implied license analysis simply ignored this right
when it essentially "gave away" to an alleged infringer the rights to sell a key component of
Anton/Bauer's patented combination. See Anton/Bauer, 329 F.3d at 135 1.
268 See Dawson, 448 U.S. 176. Specifically, the proposed analysis would have found Dawson
nonetheless to be liable for contributory infringement of Rohm & Haas' patented process. If the
proposed analysis is applied to the propanil in Dawson, an unpatented component of a patented
process, the test produces essentially the same result as the Univis exhaustion-implied license
analysis relied upon in Dawson. See Dawson, 448 U.S. at 186.
First, Rohm & Haas' propanil had no noninfringing uses, substantial or otherwise. Id. at 18586; 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (2000). Second, § 271(c) specifically provides protection for unpatented
"material[s] ... for use in practicing a patented process," such as propanil. Dawson, 448 U.S. at 182.
Third, because propanil was the only active element of Rohm & Haas' herbicidal process, it
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customers who purchased from Anton/Bauer only one of the plates necessary to
practice the patented combination would not have had an implied license to complete
the combination with a non-Anton/Bauer plate. As a result, in the absence of any
other successful defenses, PAG would have been liable for contributory infringement
269
of Anton/Bauer's patented combination.

constituted a "material part of the [patented process]." Id. at 185-86; 35 U.S.C. § 271(c). Fourth,
Dawson admitted that its propanil was "especially made or especially adapted for use in an
infringement of' Rohm & Haas' patented process. Dawson, 448 U.S. at 186; 35 U.S.C. § 271(c).
Finally, Dawson conceded that propanil was not "a staple article or commodity of commerce."
Dawson, 448 U.S. at 186; 35 U.S.C. § 271(c). Thus, the proposed analysis yields the conclusion that
propanil was protected by § 271(c) and was thus subject to a § 271(c) monopoly right.
As for the last element of the § 271(c)-implied license analysis, Rohm & Haas' customers were
granted an implied license to practice the patented process because (1) the circumstances of those
sales necessarily indicated that the propanil was acquired from the patentee, and (2) the implied
license as to propanil is fully ripened, as opposed to merely partial, because propanil was the sole
element of the patented process. Dawson, 448 U.S. at 182-83. Thus, this example illustrates that in
cases where patented processes requiring the input of only a single material or element protected by
§ 271(c) are subjected to the proposed analysis, the partiality distinction falls away.
Finally, because the lens blank in Univis was an unpatented intermediary element necessary to
the performance and completion of a patented grinding and finishing process, United States v.
Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241, 248-49 (1942), this test would also yield the same result as was
achieved in that case. Thus, under the proposed analysis, the Supreme Court's decision in Univis
would remain unchanged.
269 If the proposed analysis is applied to each of the two plates in Anton/Bauer, the test would
fail to yield an implied license to practice the patented combination as to those consumers who did
not buy from either Anton/Bauer or one of Anton/Bauer's video-industry customers devices
collectively containing both a male and a female plate. See Anton/Bauer, Inc. v. PAG, Ltd., 329 F.3d
1343 (Fed. Cir. 2003). As a result, PAG's liability for contributory infringement would ripen when
those consumers directly infringed the '204 patent by making the patented combination. See id. at
1349.
The following example demonstrates the § 271(c)-implied analysis as applied either to
Anton/Bauer's male or female plate. Since neither has any function but to be used in combination
with the other, id.at 1347, the analysis will yield the same result as to both. First, neither plate had
any noninfringing uses, substantial or otherwise. Id. at 1351; 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (2000). The fact that
Anton/Bauer's female plate could successfully be combined with PAG's male plate does not change
this conclusion. If it were otherwise, alleged contributory infringers, such as PAG, would never be
found liable for contributory infringement because once such a party actually made and sold the
accused component, the patentee thereafter would be unable to satisfy the final element of § 271(c);
for, at that point in time, the accused component would be "suitable for substantial noninfringing
use." 35 U.S.C. § 271(c). Second, § 271(c) specifically provides protection for unpatented
'component[s] of a patented . . .combination," id., such as Anton/Bauer's male and female plates.
Anton/Bauer, 329 F.3d at 1346-47. Third, because Anton/Bauer's male and female plates could only
be used together, each constituted a "material part of the [patented combination]." Anton/Bauer, 329
F.3d at 1347; 35 U.S.C. § 271(c). The existence of the materiality element is further evidenced by the
fact that in the absence of only one of the plates, the claims of the '204 patent could not be met. See
U.S. Patent No. 4,810,204 (issued Mar. 7, 1989), available at http://patft.uspto.gov/netahtml/
srchnum.htm (last visited Jan. 30, 2004). Fourth, while PAG did not directly admit that its male
plate was "especially made or especially adapted for use in an infringement of' Anton/Bauer's
patented combination, it did concede that when its male plate was placed with Anton/Bauer's female
plate, "all of the limitations of the claims of the '204 patent" were satisfied. Anton/Bauer, 329 F.3d at
1347; 35 U.S.C. § 271(c). Finally, because both plates had no other use except in combination with
each other, it is unlikely that the CAFC could have found either to be "a staple article or commodity
of commerce." Anton/Bauer, 329 F.3d at 1347; 35 U.S.C. § 271(c). Thus, the proposed analysis yields
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However, if PAG had been cognizant of the proposed analysis, perhaps it would
have chosen to put forth a more involved defense based upon the doctrine of
permissible repair. 270 Yet, even if the Anton/Bauer court had been called to address
such a defense, PAG nonetheless would have been liable for contributory
infringement because any male plates that PAG supplied to consumers would have
271
led to an "impermissible reconstruction" of Anton/Bauer's patented combination.

V. CONCLUSION

Whether any of the various analytical paths discussed in this comment can lead
to an implied license depends upon the unique facts of individual cases. However, as
applied in Anton/Bauer, the Bandag equity-implied license deprived Anton/Bauer of
the right to enforce its rights under § 271(c) as to the unpatented male plate
component of its patented combination. Moreover, Anton/Bauer lost its monopoly as
272
to the manufacturing and sale of its patented combination.
The solution articulated in this comment provides a way for courts to augment
their equity-implied license analyses. In the absence of such a solution, the day may
come when the CAFC finds that "the grant of a license to practice a patented
combination may be inferred from the sale of any part (no matter how minor) of [a
patented] combination."273 After Anton/Bauer, an alleged infringer-like the
nefarious false mother of the parable-has every reason to advocate that a
contributory infringement suit be resolved in the same harsh way that King Solomon
so wisely eschewed: by dividing the baby. 274 However, in light of the solution

presented in this comment, there is at least a glimmer of hope that King Solomon's
wisdom will be an integral part of future judicial decisions involving the doctrine of
contributory infringement and the modern baby, the § 271(c) monopoly right.
the conclusion that Anton/Bauer's male and female plates were protected by § 271(c) and were thus
subject to respective § 271(c) monopoly rights.
As for the last element of the § 271(c)-implied license analysis, exclusive customers of
Anton/Bauer would be granted an implied license to practice the patented combination because (1)
the circumstances of those sales necessarily indicate that both plates were purchased from either
Anton/Bauer or one of its video-industry customers, and (2) the result of the analysis would supply
Anton/Bauer's customers with a "partial" implied license as to each plate. Yet, because in this
scenario a partial implied license attaches to both the male and the female plate (the only
components necessary to fully practice the patented combination) each partial license would
combine to yield a fully ripened implied license. Therefore, exclusive customers of Anton/Bauer
would be permitted to practice the patented combination. Finally, this result is no different than
that which the Univis exhaustion-implied license analysis would have provided in Dawson if Rohm
& Haas' patented process had required the use of not just one, but two chemicals, providing that
both chemicals, like propanil, would have qualified individually for protection under § 271(c).
270 Aro 1365 U.S. 336, 345-46 (1961).
271 Id. at 345-46.
272 Already, methods to avoid the practical implications of the AntonlBauer decision are being
devised. Soo Christopher D. Joslyn,
Doetrines on License Negotiations,
suggestions as to how patent licenses
decision).
273 Anton/Bauer, 329 F.3d at 1352
274 See 1 Kings 3:22-28.
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